

Quantitative Easing, Bank Lending, and Aggregate Fluctuations ^{*}

Matthew Schaffer[†] Nimrod Segev[‡]

January 5, 2023

Abstract

This paper suggests a new channel through which central bank Quantitative Easing (QE) policies can amplify aggregate fluctuations. By significantly increasing excess reserve holdings in the banking sector, QE policies reduce liquidity risk and increase banks' lending potential. Thus, disturbances that increase credit demand generate a stronger increase in lending, further amplifying the shock's impact. We offer empirical evidence supporting this mechanism by utilizing two sources of variation in the US during the COVID-19 pandemic. First, we use cross-bank variation in mortgage-backed security (MBS) holdings to measure banks' exposure to QE policies. Second, we use cross-state variation in the per capita Economic Impact Payments (EIP) to quantify the local aggregate demand shock stemming from pandemic-related fiscal relief. Bank-level analysis reveals that while QE is associated with an overall increase in reserves, its impact on credit expansion depends on the magnitude of the EIP-related demand shock. Additionally, state-level evidence suggests increases in credit expansion and house prices following the shock were larger in states with greater banking sector exposure to QE. The results, therefore, suggest that QE amplified the impact of government stimulus programs during COVID-19.

Keywords: Bank lending, Quantitative easing, Covid-19, Stimulus payments.

JEL Classification code: E30, E44, E58, G21

^{*}We thank Alon Raviv (discussant), Mathias Klein (discussant), Eliezer Borenstein, Itamar Caspi, Yaakov Chen-Zion and Yossi Yakhin as well as the participants in the Bank of Israel Research Department seminar and the Halle Institute for Economic Research 23rd Macroeconometric Workshop for very helpful comments and suggestions. The views expressed here are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Israel.

[†]Department of Economics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, email:maschaff@uncg.edu.

[‡]The Bank of Israel, Research Department, email: nimrod.segev@boi.org.il.

1 Introduction

Following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) central banks in many advanced economies have adopted new tools to impact financial conditions and stimulate economic activity. One of the most popular policies has been balance sheet asset purchases, most commonly known as “quantitative easing” (QE), in which central banks purchase financial assets such as Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to impact long-term yields and, through that, increase economic activity. QE was also one of the main tools used by the Federal Reserve in response to the COVID-19 crisis, which included net purchases of around \$4.6 trillion worth of Treasury securities and agency MBS from March 2020 through March 2022 (Logan et al. 2022).

While QE’s primary purpose is to impact asset prices and financial conditions by directly purchasing long-term assets in the market, a by-product of these purchases is a rapid increase in commercial banks reserve balances. Initially, the rapid growth in reserves caused concerns that they would induce banks to increase lending through the money multiplier mechanism, which in turn would cause an increase in broad money and inflation (Keister and McAndrews 2009). However, these concerns did not materialize as the reserve increase seemed to only marginally impact bank lending and inflation. Indeed, despite the massive increase in reserves, until very recently, inflation in most advanced economies was consistently lower than central banks targets (Kuttner 2018).

The literature suggests several reasons why banks did not use their newly abundant reserves to substantially increase lending and multiply the amount of credit. First, the rise in reserves through QE does not necessarily impact the number of profitable lending opportunities available to banks. Second, most central banks started implementing monetary policy by paying interest on reserves, reducing the opportunity cost of holding reserves and thereby reducing incentives to increase lending.¹ Finally, bank lending may be limited by other regulatory restrictions such as capital asset and leverage ratios which depend on the amount of banks’ equity.

While the increase in reserves associated with QE may not have a large direct impact on lending, we argue that it reduces liquidity risk, which allows banks to more fully accommodate increases in credit demand. In other words, we argue that QE can act as an amplification mechanism. The logic of the mechanism is as follows. Liquidity risk stems from the need to settle daily interbank reserve transfers and maintain minimum reserve requirements. A bank facing an outflow of reserves due to a liquidity shock (a large payment or deposit withdrawal) may not be able to costlessly restore balances to the desired level. Since loans are generally used by borrowers to make payments to firms or individuals

¹It is essential to note that banks’ opportunity cost of holding excess reserves is not due to the option of “lending-out” reserves directly to borrowers. Instead, since reserves are used to make payment transfers between banks, any loan the bank makes is likely to be accompanied by a transfer of reserves between banks as the receiver of the loan makes the payment that the loan was needed for. Thus, when making a new loan, banks need to consider the likelihood that the loan will result in a transfer of reserves when the borrower uses the funds.

with accounts at other banks, the granting of a new loan is typically followed by an outflow of reserves, thereby increasing the bank’s susceptibility to liquidity shocks, i.e. its liquidity risk.

When banks operate with scarce reserves, any expansion of credit also implies a corresponding increase in liquidity risk. Therefore, banks cannot accommodate a significant increase in credit demand without also increasing the cost of credit. The increasing cost associated with heightened liquidity risk acts as an endogenous mechanism for mitigating the expansionary effects of a positive demand shock. However, in an abundant reserve environment, banks face much smaller liquidity risk and can, therefore, expand lending more rapidly and with a relatively smaller increase in costs. Thus, *ceteris paribus*, an increase in credit demand will result in a larger increase in bank credit, and consequently, a stronger impact on economic activity.

It is important to note that a large expansion of reserves lowers, but does not necessarily eliminate, liquidity risk in the banking system. For instance, Acharya and Rajan (2022) argue, in a theoretical model, that since the expansion of reserves following QE also led to a large expansion of runnable liabilities, it may not eliminate future episodes of liquidity stress. Similarly, Stulz et al. (2022) find evidence that at least part of the increase in the demand for reserves after the 2008 crisis was due to new supervisory liquidity requirements, suggesting a regulatory-incurred increase in liquidity risk. Afonso et al. (2022) argue that the demand for reserves can be divided into three regions: (i) reserves are *scarce* when many banks are close to their minimum liquidity requirements; (ii) reserves are *ample* when most banks have a large quantity of reserves, but have concerns about meeting their regulatory requirements and liquidity needs when faced with large liquidity shocks; and (iii) reserves are *abundant* when the aggregate quantity of reserves is so high that most banks are effectively unconcerned with breaking their liquidity requirements. The large-scale injection of reserves associated with QE can shift the banking sector between these regimes. We argue, specifically, that the QE program initiated at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a shift from an ample to an abundant reserve regime, which brought about a meaningful reduction in bank liquidity risk. Such a reduction in liquidity risk, in turn, can result in bank lending becoming more sensitive to shocks that increase credit demand.

We first present a simple model that illustrates this mechanism. Specifically, the model shows how a reduction in liquidity risk due to a QE-induced increase in bank reserves amplifies the impact of a credit demand shock. We then investigate this abundant reserve amplifying mechanism empirically and provide evidence on two points. First, we document how QE influences the response of bank lending to a demand shock, and second, we examine the implications for local economic activity and prices. To this end, we implement two sources of variation around the COVID-19 pandemic. First, we use a bank’s MBS-to-assets ratio just prior to the onset of the pandemic to measure the bank’s exposure to QE. Second, we use the variation across states in per capita payments received from the Economic Impact Payment program (EIP) to proxy for the strength of local credit demand shocks. While the first source of variation (banks’ MBS Ratio) is a standard method in the literature that examines the effects of QE²,

²See for example Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) and Luck and Zimmermann (2020) among others.

to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to use variation in EIP across states to examine the impact of aggregate demand shocks on bank lending and aggregate economic outcomes.

The data shows that a higher pre-pandemic MBS-to-assets ratio is associated with a larger increase in total reserves and lending following the beginning of QE in March 2020. These results are in line with several studies which examine the effects of QE on bank lending in the US prior to the pandemic (Rodnyansky and Darmouni 2017; Luck and Zimmermann 2020). Second, we find that banks with greater exposure to QE increased their lending by more when faced with a relatively strong EIP-related demand shock. In contrast, exposure to QE merely resulted in a larger increase in reserves with no change in lending for banks that faced a relatively weak demand shock. Finally, we show that at the state level, QE exposure strengthened the link between the EIP and increases in local house prices and mortgages. Overall the bank-level and state-level empirical results provide support for the hypothesis that QE policies amplify the aggregate effects of exogenous disturbances.

The paper makes contributions to a number of different strands of literature. First the paper is closely related to the large and growing body of work investigating the impact of QE on economic activity. Specifically, a large literature suggests that QE policies may impact the real economy by influencing financial conditions through different channels such as portfolio rebalancing (Vayanos and Vila 2021), a signalling channel (Christensen and Rudebusch 2012), and a liquidity channel (Christensen and Gillan 2022). Whithin the literature on the impact of QE, the group of papers most closely related to this one have focused on the impact of QE on bank lending. For example, Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) and Luck and Zimmermann (2020) find that QE in the period after the GFC induced banks to increase overall lending. Chakraborty et al. (2020) also find that QE is related to an increase in mortgage lending but also to a crowding out effect of other type of loans, especially commercial lending. Grosse-Rueschkamp et al. (2019) suggest a capital structure channel where the improved financial conditions following QE induces firms to substitute bank loans with bond debt, thereby relaxing banks' lending constraints and improving overall lending conditions. While these studies have mostly focused on the direct impact of QE on bank lending, this paper focuses instead on how QE impacts the sensitivity of the banking sector to aggregate disturbances.

Also, related to this paper are a number of recent studies which suggest that QE may impact bank risk-taking. For example, Kurtzman et al. (2022) use survey data to show that QE following the GFC significantly lowered lending standards and increased loan risk characteristics. Kandrac and Schlusche (2021) show that QE-induced reserve accumulation by the banking sector led to an increase in risk-taking. Importantly, these papers focus on banks' *portfolio response* to increases in their reserves holdings, i.e. a substitution towards riskier credit and security investment following QE. The channel described in this paper, on the other hand, focuses on the sensitivity of the banking system to aggregate disturbances. The mitigation of liquidity risk in an abundant reserve regime, and its resulting amplification of aggregate demand shocks, is independent of compositional shifts in portfolio risk profiles.

Second, the paper is related to the literature on bank liquidity management and credit supply.

DeYoung and Jang (2016) show empirically that nearly all US commercial banks engaged in active management of their liquidity in the period of 1992 through 2012, suggesting a key role for liquidity risk considerations. In a theoretical model, Bianchi and Bigio (2022) show that banks face a trade-off between making new loans and minimizing liquidity risk. In their model monetary policy works by impacting this trade-off and hence the willingness of banks to make loans. We contribute to this literature by highlighting that liquidity management, and its negative influence on credit supply, becomes less relevant in an abundant reserve environment.

Third, the paper is related to the rapidly growing body of work on the COVID-19 pandemic and associated policy responses. More precisely, the paper adds to the literature studying the effect of COVID-19 on bank lending and performance (Li et al. 2020;olak and Öztekin 2021; Beck and Keil 2022), and the literature investigating the impact of pandemic-era government stimulus programs. Consistent with our interpretation of the EIP as a positive aggregate demand shock, a number of studies have shown that government stimulus measures during the pandemic (and other crisis periods) reduce household liquidity constraints and increase consumption (Broda and Parker 2014; Kaplan and Violante 2014; Kreiner et al. 2019; Baker et al. 2020; Soyres et al. 2022; Greenwood et al. 2022; Parker et al. 2022). To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to study whether QE influenced the effectiveness of government stimulus during the pandemic, and the first to show how QE can amplify the impact of disturbances in the economy more generally. Lastly, the paper is related to recent studies which analyze the factors behind the post-pandemic surge in inflation (Soyres et al. 2022; Di Giovanni et al. 2022; Reis 2022). We contribute to this literature by documenting QE’s role in exacerbating house price pressures following the EIP shock.

This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 illustrates the mechanism through which QE can amplify aggregate disturbances. Section 3 presents the empirical specification and data sources. Section 4 presents the empirical results and robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.

2 Theoretical Motivation

In this section we provide a simple graphical model to illustrate the primary mechanism through which an abundant reserve regime makes the banking sector more responsive to exogenous shocks.³

Figure 1 presents a graphical representation of the market for bank reserves (sub-figure A) and the market for bank loans (sub-figure B). Before 2008, central banks reserves were sufficiently scarce. In such a system, central banks set a range for the overnight money market rate using the discount window rate as the upper bound and interest rate on reserves (R^m) as the lower bound, represented by the horizontal parts of the demand curve. Rates between the two horizontal lines imply an opportunity cost for holding excess reserves, represented by the downward sloping demand curve.

³To focus on the intuition, the analysis will be carried out graphically. A more formal model for the impact of banks’ liquidity management on credit expansion is presented in Appendix C.1

[Enter Figure 1 here]

In the market for bank loans (sub-figure B), the scarce reserve regime is represented by an upward sloping supply curve since, with insufficient reserves, the bank faces liquidity risk. That is, the bank is more exposed to a liquidity shock (large payment or deposit withdrawal) which could cause reserve balances to drop below the minimum regulatory requirement (or below the level the bank needs to maintain its daily transfer operations). In a world with no frictions, the bank can obtain the required reserves on demand in the interbank market or by selling assets (for example, bonds); therefore, the liquidity risk will be minimal, and its cost fully predicted. However, in a more realistic setting with frictions, the bank might be unable to find a buyer for their assets or a lender in the interbank market. In that case, the bank might be forced to either sell assets at a very low rate (fire sale) or pay the penalty for borrowing at the higher rate in the discount window.⁴ The slope of the supply curve is, therefore, upward sloping because banks will be more willing to increase their leverage and liquidity risk with higher rates. The equilibrium loan rate is then determined by the interaction of the bank supply curve with a conventional downward sloping demand curve.

Note that the left-hand side of the supply curve is horizontal at some minimum lending rate. The horizontal line represents a situation where the share of reserves on bank balance sheets is so large that banks face no liquidity risk. With zero liquidity risk, the bank will be willing to provide non-risky borrowers loans at a rate close to the rate they receive for holding reserves. Since banks have more than enough reserves to cushion any realistic liquidity shock, granting a marginal loan does not impact their marginal cost, which is represented by the horizontal line. It is important to note that the floor for the lending rate is strongly influenced by the interest rate paid on reserves or the interest rate in the interbank market (the higher of the two), not because banks actively lend reserves to borrowers. Rather, when banks give a new loan, they expand their balance sheet by writing deposits on the liability side and a corresponding loan on the asset side. Therefore, banks do not lose reserves in the process of loan origination. However, as loans are likely to be used for payments, and the payments are likely to be to firms or individuals with banks accounts in other banks, the granting of a new loan is typically followed by a transfer of reserves and, therefore, banks incorporate the price of losing reserves into the minimum pricing of the loan.

Figure 2 presents a model for the abundant reserve regime. Recall that a by-product of QE is a substantial increase in bank reserves. As the central bank buys long-term assets, they replace those assets with central bank reserves. Thus, in the reserve market, QE shifts the supply curve to the right, all the way to the horizontal part of the curve. In this area, reserves are so abundant that competition and no-arbitrage will push the interbank rate to the rate paid on reserves, R^m . In such a regime, monetary policy's main tool has shifted from open market operations which impacted the location of

⁴Due to stigma associated with borrowing at the discount window banks might even be willing to pay a rate above the discount rate in the interbank market.

the supply curve, to changing the R^m , which affects the minimum interest rate in the loan market. In the bank loan market, the increase in the total amount of reserves induces a widening of the horizontal part of the supply curve. That is, with the central bank drastically expanding its balance sheet and the total amount of reserves, it also eliminates any liquidity risk that banks previously faced.

[Enter Figure 2 here]

As is standard, we assume a positive aggregate demand shock increases the demand for bank credit. This increase in demand is represented in both figures by a shift of the demand curve to the right. Moreover, in both regimes, the demand shock induces an expansion of credit. Note, however, that for a given demand shock, bank credit will increase more in the abundant reserve regime relative to the scarce reserve regime. Thus, a reduction in liquidity risk implies a stronger credit expansion following an aggregate demand shock.

3 Data and Empirical Methodology

3.1 Background on QE and EIP during the pandemic

This section describes the QE and EIP policies undertaken during the pandemic. Additionally, the section discusses the bank- and state-level sources of variation in exposure to these policies.

3.1.1 Measuring exposure to QE

Between March 2020 and March 2022, the Federal Reserve implemented its largest ever asset purchase program. Significant market stress at the onset of the pandemic pushed the Federal Reserve to step in and purchase securities at an unprecedented scale. The initial reaction of the Fed was to almost immediately increase treasury holdings by \$500 billion and MBS holdings by about \$200 billion. The magnitude of the purchases was scaled down by June 2020 as financial conditions improved, but the Fed continued to increase its holdings of Treasury securities by at least \$80 billion per month and of agency MBS by at least \$40 billion per month until November 2021, when it first announced that it would begin reducing the monthly pace of its purchases. By March 2022, the net purchase of securities by the Fed was concluded. Overall, net acquisitions of securities by the Fed during the period totaled \$4.6 trillion, more than doubling the Fed's balance sheet.

We measure exposure to QE using a bank's average MBS holdings in the period before the QE episode (Rodnyansky and Darmouni 2017; Chakraborty et al. 2020; Luck and Zimmermann 2020). The identification relies on two assumptions. First, banks that held more MBS before the pandemic were relatively more affected by the MBS purchases. The literature suggests that banks with higher MBS holdings benefit more from QE due to their greater exposure to the mortgage market (Luck and Zimmermann 2020), improved capital and liquidity position (Rodnyansky and Darmouni 2017), and from active participation in the secondary market (Chakraborty et al. 2020).

Second, the literature suggests that MBS-to-total-asset ratios (MBS ratios henceforth) tend to be fairly sticky over time for individual banks (Rodnyansky and Darmouni 2017; Chakraborty et al. 2020). The persistence of MBS holdings reduces concerns that bank MBS holdings are endogenously determined by anticipation of QE. Additionally, it suggests that bank fixed effects are likely to absorb the impact of unobserved bank characteristics that might impact decisions around MBS holdings. Thus, in the baseline empirical specifications, the impact of quantitative easing on an individual bank is estimated using the bank’s average MBS ratio in the four quarters of 2019.

To capture banking sector exposure to QE at the state-level, we calculate the weighted average of the bank-specific MBS ratios for all banks with a presence in a given state in 2019. The share of a bank’s branches within the state are used as weights. Figure 3 presents the state-level average MBS ratios, which take on values from around 5% to 15% with noticeable variation across states and regions.

[Enter Figure 3 here]

3.1.2 Measuring exposure to fiscal stimulus checks

From April 2020 until March 2021 the US government sent three rounds of economic impact payments (EIP) directly to households to address the COVID-19 pandemic. In total, approximately \$810 billion has been disbursed through these payments. Each round was slightly different in both magnitude and qualifying parameters. The first round, which was distributed in April-May 2020, sent payments of up to \$1,200 to eligible individuals. The second and third rounds sent eligible individuals \$600 in January 2021 and a final \$1,400 in March 2021. Our identification strategy builds on the fact that eligibility to receive EIP was primarily based on two requirements: residency status and the household adjusted gross income.

Regarding household income, full payments were only distributed if annual gross household earnings did not exceed: (i) \$150,000 if married and filing a joint return; (ii) \$112,500 if filing as head of household; (iii) \$75,000 for eligible individuals with any other filing status. Payments were then reduced by 5% of the amount by which income exceeds the applicable threshold until reaching zero.

The second important restriction was the citizenship or residence status of the individual. Specifically, to qualify for a stimulus payment, one had to be a US citizen, permanent resident, or qualifying resident alien.⁵ The identification builds on the fact that these eligibility requirements produced significant variation across regions in the per capita magnitude of the stimulus. This variation can be observed in Figure 4, which displays the total per capita payments received in each state, with the highest average payment being \$2,740 in West Virginia and the lowest being \$2,150 in Massachusetts (about 20% lower).

⁵Individuals who did not qualify for payments because of residency statuses include: undocumented immigrants, F-1 student visa holders, other student/trainee visa holders (including J, M, and Q visas), B-1 or B-2 visa holders, H-1B visa holders who did not pass the substantial presence test, and anyone without a Social Security number or who files a tax return using an ITIN.

[Enter Figure 4 here]

The EIP data, available on IRS.gov, reports payments made in each round. The payments are classified by state with information on the number of payments, dollar amounts, and other qualitative aspects. While the IRS reports the amount of stimulus distributed in each round, it is difficult to know when the payment was received due to differences in payment distribution methods and differences in the reported period for each round.⁶ Therefore, to quantify bank-level exposure to EIP, we sum the total dollar amount of payments distributed in each state over the first two years of the pandemic and divide by state population to form a per capita measure. Bank-level EIP exposure is then constructed as the weighted mean of per capita EIP for all states that a bank has branches in, using the number of branches in each state as weights.

$$EIP_i = \sum_j w_{i,j} * EIP_j$$

where $w_{i,j}$ is the share of bank i 's branches in state j in 2021.

Recent empirical evidence suggests fiscal stimulus during the pandemic increased demand for bank loans around the world (Olak and Öztekin 2021; Aizenman et al. 2022). There are a number of channels through which stimulus may have contributed to an increase in credit demand. First, fiscal stimulus may reduce borrower liquidity constraints, as Coibion et al. (2020) show that liquidity constrained individuals were more likely to use the stimulus checks to pay off debt. Second, the fiscal stimulus may induce a fiscal multiplier effect. Recent literature suggests that government spending during the pandemic was effective in stimulating economic activity, boosting confidence, and reducing unemployment (Deb et al. 2021; Soyres et al. 2022). This uptick in economic activity and sentiment can in turn drive a higher demand for credit.

Thus, we postulate that differences in the magnitude of the EIP generated a heterogeneous aggregate demand shock across states. We exploit this state-level variation in per capita EIP to investigate how QE influences the relationship between aggregate demand shocks and local economic aggregates. The identification rests on two key assumptions: (i) that differences between states in the share of eligible individuals from the total population did not impact policymakers' decisions when setting the eligibility restrictions, and (ii) that there are no unobserved confounding factors driving both the response of high QE exposure banks during the pandemic and the variation in EIP across states.

While the first assumption seems relatively uncontroversial, the second assumption may require additional justification. For instance, non-eligibility could be negatively correlated with income and positively correlated with population density, while banks in high density areas may originate more

⁶EIP 1 began issuance in April 10 with the reported data cumulative for 2020. EIP 2 began issuance in Dec 29 2020 with the reported data cumulative to early Feb 2021. EIP 3 began issuance in March 17 with reported data cumulative to either Jun or Dec 2021.

mortgages and have higher MBS holdings. In order to mitigate this type of endogeneity concern, Fig 5 presents a scatterplot of bank MBS-to-Asset ratio versus exposure to EIP. The figure shows no systematic relation between the two measures, reducing the concern that an unobserved confounding factor may be driving the results in our empirical analysis.

[Enter Figure 5 here]

An additional concern is that state-level heterogeneity in credit demand during the pandemic may be driven by variation in eligible and non-eligible individuals, rather than variation in stimulus payments. For example, non-eligibility might be related to employment in more cyclically-sensitive jobs such as in the service sector. Thus, the link between the EIP and economic outcomes might be due to confounding state-level factors related to occupational or sectoral heterogeneity. We mitigate such concerns by using a panel specification with state-fixed effects that capture time invariant factors such as population density, and time varying controls that capture the pandemic’s local severity and economic impact. In the robustness section, we also focus on a subsample of banks that operate in a single state, which allows us to include state-by-time fixed effects that effectively control for all unobserved time-varying state-level factors.⁷

To summarize, the empirical strategy exploits the differences in average stimulus payments across states to capture the magnitude of government stimulus during the pandemic and to study their impact on bank lending and local economic conditions.

3.2 Methodology

3.2.1 Variation at the bank-level

We begin the empirical investigation by using bank-level data to examine how the Federal Reserve’s large scale asset purchases affected banks’ lending and reserve accumulation. We then test whether exposure to QE impacted the link between the Economic Impact Payments and bank lending. To this end, we largely follow Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) and estimate the following bank-level panel regression:

$$\log(y_{i,t}) = \alpha_i + \beta_1 MBS\ Ratio_i + \beta_2 QE_t + \beta_3 QE_t * MBS\ Ratio_i + \gamma Z_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

where $y_{i,t}$ is either bank i ’s total lending in quarter t or bank i ’s total amount of reserves. *MBS Ratio* is each bank’s average MBS-to-assets ratio during the four quarters of 2019. *QE* is a dummy variable that takes the value of one from the second quarter of 2020. $Z_{i,t-1}$ are bank-level controls that include

⁷While we believe there is convincing evidence to support our assumption that state-level variation in EIP payments lead to differences in credit demand across states, it is worth noting that even if this assumption fails to hold, and EIP payments are merely proxying for some unobservable state-level characteristic like differences in eligible and non-eligible characteristics, the main interpretation of our results, i.e, that QE amplifies local demand shocks, is unchanged.

ROA, size, deposits-to-assets ratio (DEP) and capital-to-assets ratio. α_i is a bank fixed effect and $\epsilon_{i,t}$ is an error term. For all specifications we also report results when including a time-fixed effect. The sample period is from the third quarter of 2019 until the fourth quarter of 2021; three quarters before the first round of EIP (2020Q2) until three quarters after the last round (2021Q1). Since the estimation strategy is akin to a difference-in-differences approach, the sample period is intentionally short to reduce the impact of confounding factors as suggested by Roberts and Whited (2013).⁸

We then examine QE’s role as a potential amplification mechanism by splitting the sample into banks with EIP exposure below the sample median (weak aggregate demand shocks) and banks with EIP exposure equal to or above the sample median (strong aggregate demand shocks). If the abundant reserve environment brought on by QE eliminates liquidity risk and amplifies shocks in the manner predicted by our model, we should expect banks faced with a stronger shock to increase lending relatively more. We test this by estimating Eq.(1) separately for each sub-sample.

Finally, we examine the dynamic relationship between the *MBS Ratio* and the bank-level dependent variables. The dynamic specification reduces concerns that banks with different MBS ratios were experiencing different pre-existing trends in lending and reserves prior to the pandemic. Specifically, we re-estimate Eq. (1) for the weak and strong shock sub-samples and replace *QE* with a series of dummy variables:

$$\log(y_{i,t}) = \alpha_i + \sum_{t=-2}^7 \beta_t MBS Ratio_i * D_t + \gamma Z_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

where $\sum_{t=-2}^7 \beta_t$ represent the coefficients for a specific dummy variable for each quarter. The coefficient for 2020Q1, the quarter before QE started (considered $t = 0$) is normalized to zero. All other control variables are the same as in Eq. (1), including bank and time fixed effects.

3.2.2 Variation at the state-level

We next examine how QE exposure influenced the response of state-level aggregates to the EIP aggregate demand shock. To do so, we use simple state-level panel regressions that allow for state and time fixed effects in the spirit of the region-level estimation in Luck and Zimmermann (2020) :

$$y_{j,t} = \alpha_j + \beta_1 EIP_{j,t} + \beta_2 EIP_{j,t} * Treat_j + \gamma X_{j,t} + \epsilon_{j,t} \quad (3)$$

$$y_{j,t} = \alpha_j + \beta_1 EIP_{j,t} + \beta_2 EIP_{j,t} * MBS Ratio_j + \gamma X_{j,t} + \epsilon_{j,t} \quad (4)$$

⁸Results are robust to using a longer pre-pandemic time period, see Section 4.2.3.

where $y_{j,t}$ is either the growth rate in house prices or growth rate of total mortgage loans in state j at year t .⁹ EIP is the total per capita payments received in each state as part of the Economic Impact Payments stimulus program.¹⁰ In Eq. (3) we capture state-level exposure to QE through a dummy variable, $Treat$, which is equal to one if the state-level $MBS Ratio$ is equal to or above the sample median. Alternatively, in Eq. (4) we directly insert our continuous measure of state banking sector exposure to QE, the weighted mean of bank-level $MBS Ratio_i$, with the number of branches as weights. $X_{j,t}$ are state-level controls that include GDP growth and change in unemployment. α_j is a state fixed effect and $\epsilon_{j,t}$ is an error term. For all specifications we also report results including time-fixed effects.

3.3 Final sample

To arrive at the final sample, we combine data from several sources. The quarterly bank-level data are from the Call Reports. We exclude any bank with missing variables in any of the sample quarters. Additionally, we keep only banks that operated in every quarter from 2018-2021. The resulting bank balance sheet variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels to avoid outliers.

The state-level regressions are estimated using annual data from 2018 through 2021. State-level total Economic Impact Payments (EIP) are from the IRS. Other state-level variables, such as total population, real GDP, and unemployment, are from the BEA. Finally, the state-level house price index is from the FHFA and the dollar value of new mortgages in a given year are from the HMDA database. To construct a state-level measure of exposure to QE we use the weighted average of the MBS ratio for all banks that operate branches in a state, using the number of branches as weights.¹¹ Table 1 presents bank-level (Panel A) and state-level (Panel B) descriptive statistics for the full sample and splitting by level of QE exposure.

[Enter Table 1 here]

Panel A suggests that banks with higher exposure to QE tend to be larger than those with low exposure. On the other hand, there do not appear to be significant differences between the groups in profitability, capitalization, deposit dependency and lending-to-total-assets composition. Similarly, Panel B shows that larger states tend to also have banking sectors with higher exposure to QE.

⁹Note that, in contrast to the quarterly bank-level results, we can only analyze the state-level outcomes at an annual frequency. Consistent with Luck and Zimmermann (2020), the region-level estimation focuses on the growth in total credit rather than the log level. The results are similar in either form (See Appendix Table 15).

¹⁰For the state-level estimation the EIP data is aggregated to a state-year frequency, using the first round for 2020 and the sum of the second and third rounds for 2021.

¹¹The number of branches per bank in every state is from the FDIC Summary of Deposits database. See Section C.3 in the appendix for more details on data sources and variable construction.

4 Empirical Results

4.1 Bank-level

Table 2 presents the bank-level results from estimating Eq.(1). The dependent variables in panels A and B are the log of total bank lending and log of total bank reserves, respectively. The columns present results with different combinations of controls and fixed effects. The main coefficient of interest is β_3 , which represents how banks' initial exposure to QE impacted their lending outcomes (panel A) and reserve outcomes (Panel B) during the QE period. The estimated coefficients for the interaction term are positive and significant across all specifications in both panels. This suggests that banks with higher MBS-to-assets exposure before the pandemic experienced an overall higher level of both lending and reserves after enactment of the Fed's QE program. Specifically, the coefficients imply that a bank with a 1% higher MBS ratio prior to the pandemic expanded reserves by 0.3%-0.4% and lending by 1%.

[Enter Table 2 here]

We now examine the EIP's impact on the bank-level results using the sample split described in Section 3.2. Table 3 presents the results for running the same bank-level estimation separately for a sample of banks with low exposure to the EIP during the pandemic and banks with higher exposure. Panels A and B again present results for the log of total bank lending and the log of total reserves, respectively. In each panel, columns 1-4 present the results for the sample of banks with relatively low exposure to EIP, while columns 5-8 present the results for the sample of banks with relatively high exposure. Focusing first on Panel A, we can see that the coefficient on the interaction of the MBS ratio before QE and the QE period dummy is larger in magnitude and more significant for the sample of banks that, because of the states they operate in, were more exposed to the EIP. This suggests that the magnitude of the credit expansion during the pandemic depended on a combination of QE exposure and a strong demand shock that the EIP induced. This result fits well with the theoretical argument that QE, on its own, does not cause a notable expansion of credit but does make the bank more willing and able to expand credit when faced with an increase in demand.

[Enter Table 3 here]

The difference between samples is even more striking in Panel B where the impact of QE on reserves is positive and significant in the low EIP sample and marginally negative in the high EIP sample. This result also fits with the central hypothesis. Recall that QE injects reserves almost mechanically to banks with higher initial MBS holdings on their balance sheets. With no additional change in banks' behavior, these reserves will remain on the balance sheet of those banks. However, suppose banks also expand credit. Then, through the function of the payment systems, some of those additional reserves will move to the balance sheets of other banks, some of which may not have any direct exposure to the QE program. Thus, with credit expanding, reserves will spread across the banking sector. Therefore,

it is not surprising that banks that expanded lending also saw a relative reduction in reserves, as those reserves flow to the rest of the banking sector. Taken together, the sample split regressions indicate that while QE may have only a modest direct impact on bank lending, it significantly increases banks' ability and willingness to expand credit when faced with a meaningful demand shock.

The quarter-by-quarter dynamic effect of QE is shown in Figure 6. Panel A presents the dynamic impact of the quarters associated with the QE policy on lending, and Panel B shows the effect on reserves. In each panel, coefficients are presented separately for low and high EIP banks. The figure illustrates several important points. First, in the period before 2020Q2, the estimates for the two samples seem to co-move together, reducing the concern that differences in pre-existing trends between the groups are driving the results. Second, more significant exposure to QE is significantly related to an expansion of credit during the pandemic only for the sample of banks that were more exposed to EIP. Finally, for both low and high EIP samples, QE exposure is related to a significant jump in total bank reserves immediately after the Fed implemented the COVID-19-related QE policy. However, while reserves remained significantly elevated for the low EIP samples, the high EIP banks experienced a steady decrease in reserves, consistent with the expansion of credit in that group.

[Enter Figure 6 here]

We also examine potential heterogeneity across different categories of loans. Table 4 presents results from estimating Eq.(1) with Commercial and Industrial (CI) loans as the outcome variable (Panel A) and with Real Estate (RE) loans as the outcome variable (Panel B). The results are consistent with our baseline estimation, as banks with greater exposure to QE increase both types of lending by more if faced with a strong EIP shock, but not if they are faced with a weak EIP shock

[Enter Table 4 here]

Figure 7 presents the dynamic impact for the two loan categories. While there was a larger increase in both for banks facing a strong EIP shock, the timing of the expansions differed noticeably. CI loans increased more rapidly at the beginning of the crisis, whereas the increase in RE loans only becomes significant as the pandemic began to recede in the latter half of 2021. The increase in CI lending at the beginning of the pandemic is consistent with Li et al. (2020) which shows that at the onset of the pandemic firms drew funds on a massive scale from preexisting credit lines. Importantly, they argue that banks were able to accommodate this "massive dash for cash" because of an inflow of funds from the Federal Reserve. The fact that RE loans increase in the latter part of the sample while CI loans decrease is consistent Chakraborty et al. (2020) who find that, following QE, high-MBS banks disproportionately increased mortgage originations while simultaneously reducing commercial lending (i.e., an eventual crowding out effect).

[Enter Figure 7 here]

4.2 Robustness: bank-level

4.2.1 COVID-19 impact

COVID-19’s impact on health, safety, and other government policies present potentially major confounding factors during our sample period. In this subsection we extend our analysis by explicitly controlling for the most prominent concerns. First, the regional impact of COVID-19 on health outcomes varied by region and time. Locations with higher COVID-19 caseloads were likely to see declines in economic activity as more individuals stayed home and more businesses stayed shut. We therefore directly control for new COVID-19 cases per capita in all counties that a bank has branches in when re-estimating Eq.(1).

A policy-related concern is that our results may be driven by variation in banks’ exposure to other government support programs. Specifically, recent studies suggest that government-guaranteed loans, specifically the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) in the US, played a significant role in reducing the adverse impact of the pandemic on loan supply (Karakaplan 2021; Beck and Keil 2022). To check whether the expansion of lending observed in Table 3 is driven primarily by PPP loans, we include a bank’s ratio of PPP-loans-to-total-loans as an additional control variable when re-estimating Eq.(1).

[Enter Table 5 here]

Results from estimating Eq.(1) with the *Covid* and *PPP* control variables are presented in Table 5. The results are largely unaltered relative to Table 3, as the only specification to report a meaningfully different coefficient lacks fixed effects and bank-level controls. Overall, the estimates once again imply that banks with greater exposure to QE increase lending more when faced with a strong EIP demand shock, whereas greater QE exposure only leads to an increase in reserves when faced with a weak EIP shock.

While higher COVID caseloads tended to endogenously decrease local economic activity, many local governments also imposed a variety of mobility restrictions which were not necessarily correlated with contemporaneous caseloads. The mobility restrictions, which differed in timing, stringency, and duration across states, likely decreased local economic activity and credit demand independently from the effects of local COVID severity. To mitigate this concern, we focus on a subsample of banks that operate (have branches) in a single state. This allows us to add state-by-time fixed effects which control for time-varying local conditions throughout every quarter of the sample.¹² While our major concern here is to control for heterogeneous mobility restrictions, note that the state-by-time fixed effects will absorb variation from *any* confounding factor that may have evolved heterogeneously across states over the course of the pandemic.

[Enter Table 6 here]

¹²Out of the 4,763 banks in the baseline sample, 4,135 have branches in a single state during the sample period.

Table 6 presents results using the single state sample. These estimates are once again consistent with the original sample, as banks with greater QE exposure only increase lending more if faced with a strong EIP demand shock, even when accounting for any unobserved time-varying state-level factors. Indeed, the robustness of the estimates in columns 3-4 and 7-8 of the Table strongly suggest that our baseline estimates are not biased by omitted factors related to local conditions.

4.2.2 Alternative channels

One might be concerned that alternative channels, other than the reduction in liquidity risk, could be driving the stronger response of banks with higher pre-pandemic MBS holdings to the EIP shock. One natural candidate is related to bank balance sheet strength. If QE improved bank’s capital position and balance sheet strength, this stronger financial position may have allowed the bank to increase risk-taking and expand credit (Kandrac and Schlusche 2021; Kurtzman et al. 2022).

To address this possibility, we add additional interactions between the QE dummy and lagged bank-level controls that capture balance sheet strength. When controlling for these additional interactions, the coefficient on the interaction between MBS holdings and QE can be interpreted as the impact which is not explained by possible improvements in bank balance sheet strength.

[Enter Table 7 here]

Table 7 presents results from this exercise. While the balance sheet strength-QE interactions enter many of the specifications with statistically significant coefficients, their inclusion does not alter the coefficient of interest. The interaction between MBS holdings and QE in Panel A remains larger and more significant for banks that face a strong EIP shock, indicating that even when controlling for balance sheet changes, greater exposure to QE results in a larger expansion of loans following a larger demand shock. Similarly in Panel B, the interaction between MBS holdings and QE remains positive and significant for banks that face a weak EIP shock, indicating that greater exposure to QE merely results in an expansion of reserves following a smaller demand shock. Overall, the estimates in Table 7 reassure that our empirical results are driven by the liquidity risk mechanism outlined in Section 2, rather than alternatives related to improved balance sheet conditions.

4.2.3 Additional tests

In Appendix C.2 we consider several additional robustness checks to our bank-level analysis. Table 10 shows the results are robust to using only a single quarter in 2019 to measure MBS holdings, as in Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) and Kapoor and Peia (2021). Table 11 considers an alternative, discrete bank-level measure of QE exposure consistent with Chakraborty et al. (2020) and Luck and Zimmermann (2020). Specifically, the table reports results where the sample is restricted to banks in the upper and lower tercile of the distribution and the continuous MBS ratio is replaced with a dummy variable, MBS^{high} that is equal to one if the bank is in the upper tercile and zero otherwise. Results

are once again consistent. Lastly, we begin the sample in 2018Q2 in Table 12 to allow for symmetric pre- and post-pandemic periods, and obtain similar results to the baseline sample.

4.3 State-level

We next examine if the stronger expansion of credit induced by the combination of greater QE exposure and larger government stimulus is related to more rapid growth in state-level aggregates. Table 8 examines the state-level results from estimating Eq. (3). The dependent variable is the percent change in the state house price index (columns 1-2) and the percent change in total new mortgage lending (columns 3-4). Examining first the coefficient on the EIP, we find that while the EIP is positively related to the house price index, there is no significant relation to the expansion of mortgage credit. However, the coefficient on the interaction between *Treat*, the dummy for the stronger exposure to the QE program, and the EIP is positive and significant for both the house price index and total new mortgage lending. This result suggests that the EIP on its own indeed increased total demand for housing, but the impact of this demand shock on bank credit depended on the banking sector’s exposure to QE. This result strongly supports the hypothesis that an abundant reserve regime (induced by QE) can amplify aggregate demand shocks. That is, while an exogenous shock, in this case, a stimulus-induced demand shock, can directly cause an increase prices, the external shock will also induce an expansion of credit in a banking sector that has experienced a large injection of reserves. The expansion of credit will, in turn, contribute to an even stronger increase in prices.

[Enter Table 8 here]

Table 9 presents the results when using the continuous QE exposure measure for each state, rather than the *Treat* dummy variable. While the individual EIP coefficient loses statistical significance, the coefficient of interest on the interaction term remains robust. Looking at column (1), the magnitude of the EIP coefficient implies that a \$1,000 increase in per capita state stimulus payments is associated with a roughly 5.6 percentage point increase in state house price growth. The interaction coefficient, then, implies that the same \$1,000 increase in per capita EIP payments results in a roughly 5.9 percentage point increase when accompanied by a one percentage point increase in state-level MBS ratio. In other words, a one percentage point increase in a state’s pre-pandemic average MBS ratio is associated with a nearly 5% larger impact of EIP stimulus on local house prices.¹³

Therefore, whether measuring state exposure to QE as a binary variable or continuously, our findings consistently show that local banking sector exposure to QE impacted the connection between the EIP and state-level aggregates.¹⁴ Indeed, while the bank-level analysis supports our contention that banks

¹³0.273 percentage points / 5.589 percentage points equals 0.049.

¹⁴In Appendix C.2, Table 13 shows the state-level results are also robust to (i) Excluding Delaware and South Dakota, as is common in several prior studies that study state level banking sectors; and Table 14 shows they are robust to (ii) adding state level annual COVID-19 cases and deaths per 1000 people as additional controls.

increase credit more in response to a demand shock under an abundant reserve regime, the evidence in this section suggests that the heightened lending response amplifies the effects of the shock on broader economic activity.

[Enter Table 9 here]

5 Conclusions

This paper suggests a new link between central bank QE programs and aggregate fluctuations. Namely, we argue that QE increases banks' sensitivity to aggregate demand shocks. The primary mechanism which causes the increase in credit sensitivity is that QE, by imposing an ample reserve regime, nullifies liquidity risk, which had otherwise functioned as a natural stabilizer when the economy was faced with an increase in credit demand (under a scarce reserve regime). We provide empirical evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic that supports the amplifying role of QE on exogenous disturbances. By utilizing variation in banks' pre-pandemic exposure to QE and variation across states in the magnitude of government stimulus payments, we show that QE significantly strengthened the link between the government stimulus and local economic activity.

The recent surge in prices worldwide has renewed interest in analyzing the driving forces of inflation. The mechanism described in this paper suggests that the extraordinary actions taken by central banks during the pandemic may have amplified governments' unprecedented fiscal stimulus, which resulted in stronger inflationary pressures, as evidenced by larger increases in house prices in states that experienced higher stimulus payments *and* greater exposure to QE. In an ample reserve regime, inflation vulnerability can increase because the abundance of reserves eliminates liquidity risk and allows banks to more fully accommodate increases in credit demand.

There are limitations and extensions which should be acknowledged. First, empirically identifying the effects of QE and the government EIP program while disentangling their impact from other actions taken during the pandemic is extremely challenging. It must be admitted that the validity of our analysis is threatened by an unusually large number of confounding factors. However, our attempts at controlling for these factors consistently produce results consistent with the hypothesis that QE increases the sensitivity of bank credit, and thereby aggregate economic outcomes, to external shocks. Second, the mechanism described in the paper may raise other empirically testable predictions that could have important implications for the banking and monetary transmission literature. For example, a fully elastic money market model implies a weaker pass-through between the central bank policy rate and deposit rates as banks are not deposit-constrained when extending credit and, therefore, will be less concerned with losing deposits to other, more constrained banks when interest rates increase. We hope this paper will motivate future empirical and theoretical work to explore these issues in further depth.

References

- Acharya, Viral V and Rajan, Raghuram (2022). *Liquidity, liquidity everywhere, not a drop to use-Why flooding banks with central bank reserves may not expand liquidity*. Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Afonso, Gara, Giannone, Domenico, La Spada, Gabriele, and Williams, John C (2022). “Scarce, Abundant, or Ample? A Time-Varying Model of the Reserve Demand Curve”. *A Time-Varying Model of the Reserve Demand Curve (May 1, 2022)*. *FRB of New York Staff Report* 1019.
- Agénor, Pierre-Richard and El Aynaoui, Karim (2010). “Excess liquidity, bank pricing rules, and monetary policy”. *Journal of Banking & Finance* 34.5, pp. 923–933.
- Aizenman, Joshua, Jinjarak, Yothin, and Spiegel, Mark M (2022). *Fiscal stimulus and commercial bank lending under COVID-19*. Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Andolfatto, David (2021). “Assessing the impact of central bank digital currency on private banks”. *The Economic Journal* 131.634, pp. 525–540.
- Baker, Scott R, Farrokhnia, Robert A, Meyer, Steffen, Pagel, Michaela, and Yannelis, Constantine (2020). *Income, liquidity, and the consumption response to the 2020 economic stimulus payments*. Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Beck, Thorsten and Keil, Jan (2022). “Have banks caught corona? Effects of COVID on lending in the US”. *Journal of Corporate Finance* 72, p. 102160.
- Bianchi, Javier and Bigio, Saki (2022). “Banks, liquidity management, and monetary policy”. *Econometrica* 90.1, pp. 391–454.
- Broda, Christian and Parker, Jonathan A (2014). “The economic stimulus payments of 2008 and the aggregate demand for consumption”. *Journal of Monetary Economics* 68, S20–S36.
- Chakraborty, Indraneel, Goldstein, Itay, and MacKinlay, Andrew (2020). “Monetary stimulus and bank lending”. *Journal of Financial Economics* 136.1, pp. 189–218.
- Chang, Su-Hsin, Contessi, Silvio, and Francis, Johanna L (2014). “Understanding the accumulation of bank and thrift reserves during the US financial crisis”. *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 43, pp. 78–106.
- Christensen, Jens HE and Gillan, James M (2022). “Does quantitative easing affect market liquidity?” *Journal of Banking & Finance* 134, p. 106349.
- Christensen, Jens HE and Rudebusch, Glenn D (2012). “The response of interest rates to US and UK quantitative easing”. *The Economic Journal* 122.564, F385–F414.

- Coibion, Olivier, Gorodnichenko, Yuriy, and Weber, Michael (2020). *How did US consumers use their stimulus payments?* Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Deb, Pragyan, Furceri, Davide, Ostry, Jonathan D, Tawk, Nour, and Yang, Naihan (2021). “The effects of fiscal measures during COVID-19”.
- DeYoung, Robert and Jang, Karen Y (2016). “Do banks actively manage their liquidity?” *Journal of Banking & Finance* 66, pp. 143–161.
- Di Giovanni, Julian, Kalemli-Özcan, ebnem, Silva, Alvaro, and Yildirim, Muhammed A (2022). *Global Supply Chain Pressures, International Trade, and Inflation*. Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Greenwood, Robin, Laarits, Toomas, and Wurgler, Jeffrey (2022). *Stock Market Stimulus*. Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Grosse-Rueschkamp, Benjamin, Steffen, Sascha, and Streitz, Daniel (2019). “A capital structure channel of monetary policy”. *Journal of Financial Economics* 133.2, pp. 357–378.
- Kandrac, John and Schlusche, Bernd (2021). “Quantitative easing and bank risk taking: evidence from lending”. *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 53.4, pp. 635–676.
- Kaplan, Greg and Violante, Giovanni L (2014). “A model of the consumption response to fiscal stimulus payments”. *Econometrica* 82.4, pp. 1199–1239.
- Kapoor, Supriya and Peia, Oana (2021). “The impact of quantitative easing on liquidity creation”. *Journal of Banking & Finance* 122, p. 105998.
- Karakaplan, Mustafa U (2021). “This time is really different: The multiplier effect of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) on small business bank loans”. *Journal of Banking & Finance* 133, p. 106223.
- Keister, Todd and McAndrews, James (2009). “Why are banks holding so many excess reserves?” *Current issues in economics and finance* 15.8.
- Klein, Michael A (1971). “A theory of the banking firm”. *Journal of money, credit and banking* 3.2, pp. 205–218.
- Kreiner, Claus Thustrup, Dreyer Lassen, David, and Leth-Petersen, Søren (2019). “Liquidity constraint tightness and consumer responses to fiscal stimulus policy”. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 11.1, pp. 351–79.
- Kurtzman, Robert, Luck, Stephan, and Zimmermann, Tom (2022). “Did QE lead banks to relax their lending standards? Evidence from the Federal Reserves LSAPs”. *Journal of Banking & Finance* 138.C.

- Kuttner, Kenneth N (2018). “Outside the box: Unconventional monetary policy in the great recession and beyond”. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 32.4, pp. 121–46.
- Li, Lei, Strahan, Philip E, and Zhang, Song (2020). “Banks as lenders of first resort: Evidence from the COVID-19 crisis”. *The Review of Corporate Finance Studies* 9.3, pp. 472–500.
- Logan, Lorie et al. (2022). *Federal Reserve Asset Purchases: The Pandemic Response and Considerations Ahead*. Tech. rep.
- Luck, Stephan and Zimmermann, Tom (2020). “Employment effects of unconventional monetary policy: Evidence from QE”. *Journal of Financial Economics* 135.3, pp. 678–703.
- Ogawa, Kazuo (2007). “Why commercial banks held excess reserves: The Japanese experience of the late 1990s”. *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 39.1, pp. 241–257.
- olak, Gönül and Öztekin, Özde (2021). “The impact of COVID-19 pandemic on bank lending around the world”. *Journal of Banking & Finance* 133, p. 106207.
- Parker, Jonathan A, Schild, Jake, Erhard, Laura, and Johnson, David (2022). *Household spending responses to the economic impact payments of 2020: Evidence from the consumer expenditure survey*. Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Piazzesi, Monika and Schneider, Martin (2021). “Payments, Credit and Asset Prices”.
- Reis, Ricardo (2022). “The Burst of High Inflation in 2021–22: How and Why Did We Get Here?”
- Roberts, Michael R and Whited, Toni M (2013). “Endogeneity in empirical corporate finance1”. In: *Handbook of the Economics of Finance*. Vol. 2. Elsevier, pp. 493–572.
- Rodnyansky, Alexander and Darmouni, Olivier M (2017). “The effects of quantitative easing on bank lending behavior”. *The Review of Financial Studies* 30.11, pp. 3858–3887.
- Soyres, Francois de, Santacreu, Ana Maria, and Young, Henry (2022). “Fiscal policy and excess inflation during Covid-19: a cross-country view”.
- Stulz, René M, Taboada, Alvaro G, and Van Dijk, Mathijs A (2022). *The Determinants of Bank Liquid Asset Holdings*. Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Vayanos, Dimitri and Vila, Jean-Luc (2021). “A preferred-habitat model of the term structure of interest rates”. *Econometrica* 89.1, pp. 77–112.

A Figures

Figure 1: Model of a Scarce Reserve Regime




Figure 2: Model of an Abundant Reserve Regime






Figure 3: MBS Ratio by State




Note: The figure presents the state level weighted mean of the MBS ratio of all banks operation in every state during the period of 2018-2019.

Figure 4: Total amount of COVID-19 payments per capita by state




Note: The figure presents the total per capita payments during the COVID-19 crisis received in each state. Data on the total amount of aid is from the IRS and the total population is from the BEA.

Figure 5: Bank-level MBS Ratio and EIP




Note: The figure presents the bank level MBS ratio and EIP along with a simple linear fit line.

Figure 6: Dynamic impact



Note: This figure presents the dynamic effect of QE on the log of total bank lending (Panel A) and the log of bank reserves (Panel B) by plotting the regression coefficients from estimating Eq. (2) with 90% confidence intervals. The coefficient for 2020Q1 (quarter before QE began) is normalized to zero.

Figure 7: Dynamic impact for alternative lending categories



Note: This figure presents the dynamic effect of QE on the log of total bank Commercial and industrial loans (Panel A) and the log of total bank Real Estate loans (Panel B) by plotting the regression coefficients from estimating Eq. (2) with 90% confidence intervals. The coefficient for 2020Q1 (quarter before QE began) is normalized to zero.

B Tables

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	All		High QE Exposure		Low QE Exposure	
	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.
Panel A. Bank level						
MBS Ratio (%)	4.15	5.81	8.11	6.01	0.19	0.35
Total Loans (millions)	2,228.47	27,882.08	4,037.21	39,213.54	419.73	3,257.00
log(Total Loans)	12.20	1.60	12.69	1.71	11.70	1.30
CI Loans (millions)	493.41	6,863.13	922.22	9,666.86	64.60	625.39
Reserves (millions)	598.18	11,054.89	1,099.34	15,594.71	97.02	853.67
log(Reserves)	10.28	1.59	10.59	1.75	9.98	1.34
CAP (%)	11.58	3.43	11.28	2.92	11.88	3.86
ROA (%)	0.71	0.53	0.71	0.50	0.71	0.57
DEP (%)	84.22	6.10	84.21	5.79	84.24	6.40
Assets (millions)	4,402.03	66,500.17	8,201.59	93,795.34	602.47	4,276.66
Size	12.71	1.44	13.20	1.53	12.21	1.14
Loans to Assets (%)	62.43	16.10	61.02	15.44	63.85	16.62
CI Loans to Assets (%)	9.59	8.13	9.85	7.65	9.33	8.56
RE Loans to Assets (%)	44.64	17.34	43.61	16.13	45.67	18.41
Bank Level EIP (thousands)	2.49	0.12	2.48	0.13	2.49	0.12
Obs.	47,600		23,800		23,800	
Panel B. State level						
MBS Ratio (%)	10.62	2.52	12.61	1.49	8.63	1.60
HPI (% change)	9.26	5.13	10.06	5.53	8.47	4.60
Total Loans (millions)	51,412	93,718	74,383	124,450	28,440	33,184
Total Loans (% change)	24.94	23.05	26.62	21.57	23.26	24.44
Population	6,597,185	7,358,201	8,426,515	9,153,531	4,767,854	4,276,154
Population(% change)	0.44	0.63	0.65	0.70	0.23	0.46
Real GDP (\$ millions)	371,604	480,574	476,153	592,864	267,054	301,108
Real GDP (% change)	1.36	3.44	1.63	3.72	1.09	3.14
Unemployment (%)	4.86	1.97	5.27	2.15	4.45	1.69
Unemployment (change)	0.17	2.52	0.25	2.83	0.09	2.17
Obs.	200		100		100	

Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables used analysis for the bank level sample (Panel A) and the state level sample (Panel B). See C.3 for descriptions of all variables. Both panels provide a breakdown by high and low QE exposure using the median of bank and state level MBS ratio to split the samples.

Table 2: Bank-level results.

Panel A: $\log(\text{Loans})$				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MBS Ratio	0.073*** (0.005)			
QE	0.094*** (0.004)	0.094*** (0.004)		
MBS Ratio X QE	0.001*** (0.0005)	0.001*** (0.0005)	0.001*** (0.0005)	0.001*** (0.0004)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y
Observations	47,600	47,600	47,600	47,600
R ²	0.073	0.995	0.995	0.997
Panel B: $\log(\text{Reserves})$				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MBS Ratio	0.053*** (0.005)			
QE	0.518*** (0.010)	0.518*** (0.010)		
MBS Ratio X QE	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y
Observations	47,600	47,600	47,600	47,600
R ²	0.065	0.926	0.930	0.932

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Eq.(1). Dependent variable is log of total lending (panel A), and the log of total bank reserves (Panel B). Quarterly variables from 2019Q3 - 2021Q4. QE in a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every quarter after 2020Q1. MBS Ratio is the bank average mbs-to-asset ratios averaged over the four quarters of 2019. The bank-level controls include one quarter lagged capital-assets ratio, ROA, deposits over total assets ratio and bank size. Standard errors, clustered at the bank level are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3: Sample split by bank exposure to EIP

<i>Panel A: log(Loans)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MBS Ratio	0.085*** (0.008)				0.053*** (0.007)			
QE	0.111*** (0.006)	0.111*** (0.006)			0.080*** (0.004)	0.080*** (0.004)		
MBS Ratio X QE	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.0005)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	22,010	22,010	22,010	22,010	25,590	25,590	25,590	25,590
R ²	0.093	0.995	0.995	0.996	0.045	0.995	0.995	0.997
<i>Panel B: log(Reserves)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MBS Ratio	0.060*** (0.007)				0.037*** (0.006)			
QE	0.509*** (0.014)	0.509*** (0.014)			0.530*** (0.013)	0.530*** (0.013)		
MBS Ratio X QE	0.009*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	22,010	22,010	22,010	22,010	25,590	25,590	25,590	25,590
R ²	0.080	0.934	0.937	0.939	0.048	0.909	0.914	0.916

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Eq.(1) splitting the sample by banks exposure to the EIP, measured as the weighted mean (by number of branches) of the total EIP of all the states that a bank operates in. Dependent variables is log of total lending (panel A), and the log of total bank reserves (Panel B). In each panel columns 1-4 are all bank that their EIP exposure is below the sample median and columns 5-8 equal or above the median. Quarterly variables from 2019Q3 - 2021Q4. QE is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every quarter after 2020Q1. MBS Ratio is the bank average mbs-to-asset ratios averaged over the four quarters of 2019. The bank-level controls include one quarter lagged capital-assets ratio, ROA, deposits over total assets ratio and bank size. Standard errors, clustered at the bank level are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: Different loan categories

<i>Panel A: log(CI Loans)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MBS Ratio	0.097***				0.062***			
	(0.009)				(0.008)			
QE	0.458***	0.468***			0.323***	0.330***		
	(0.020)	(0.018)			(0.012)	(0.011)		
MBS Ratio X QE	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.0003	0.003*	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	21,220	21,220	21,220	21,220	25,010	25,010	25,010	25,010
R ²	0.089	0.970	0.973	0.975	0.049	0.972	0.976	0.977
<i>Panel B: log(RE Loans)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MBS Ratio	0.083***				0.052***			
	(0.008)				(0.007)			
QE	0.061***	0.070***			0.053***	0.049***		
	(0.008)	(0.005)			(0.005)	(0.004)		
MBS Ratio X QE	0.002	-0.0002	-0.0002	0.0002	0.001	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	21,866	21,866	21,866	21,866	25,522	25,522	25,522	25,522
R ²	0.085	0.994	0.995	0.995	0.036	0.995	0.996	0.996

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Eq.(1) splitting the sample by banks exposure to the EIP, measured as the weighted mean (by number of branches) of the total EIP of all the states that a bank operates in. Dependent variables is log of total Commercial and Industrial loans (panel A), and the log of total Real Estate loans (Panel B). In each panel columns 1-4 are all bank that their EIP exposure is below the sample median and columns 5-8 equal or above the median. Quarterly variables from 2019Q3 - 2021Q4. QE is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every quarter after 2020Q1. MBS Ratio is the bank average mbs-to-asset ratios averaged over the four quarters of 2019. The bank-level controls include one quarter lagged capital-assets ratio, ROA, deposits over total assets ratio and bank size. Standard errors, clustered at the bank level are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: Robustness - COVID-19 impact

<i>Panel A: log(Loans)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
PPP	0.025*** (0.005)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.054*** (0.004)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Covid	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0002*** (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.001*** (0.0004)	-0.0003*** (0.00004)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.00001 (0.0001)
MBS Ratio X QE	-0.0001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.0005)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	22,010	22,010	22,010	22,010	25,590	25,590	25,590	25,590
R ²	0.100	0.995	0.995	0.996	0.069	0.995	0.995	0.997
<i>Panel B: log(Reserves)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
PPP	0.018*** (0.004)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.002)	-0.0004 (0.002)	0.057*** (0.004)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Covid	-0.005*** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.0002)	-0.001*** (0.0003)	-0.001*** (0.0003)	0.001*** (0.0005)	0.002*** (0.0002)	0.001** (0.0003)	0.001*** (0.0003)
MBS Ratio X QE	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	22,010	22,010	22,010	22,010	25,590	25,590	25,590	25,590
R ²	0.085	0.934	0.937	0.939	0.075	0.910	0.914	0.916

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Eq.(1) splitting the sample by banks exposure to the EIP, with additional controls related to the COVID-19 pandemic and government response. PPP is the ratio of Paycheck Protection Program loans to total loans outstanding lagged one quarter. Covid is the weighted average of new COVID-19 cases per capita in all counties in which a bank has branches, where the number of bank branches in each county is used as weights. Dependent variables is log of total lending (panel A), and the log of total bank reserves (Panel B). In each panel columns 1-4 are all bank that their EIP exposure is below the sample median and columns 5-8 equal or above the median. Quarterly variables from 2019Q3 - 2021Q4. QE is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every quarter after 2020Q1. MBS Ratio is the bank average mbs-to-asset ratios averaged over the four quarters of 2019. The bank-level controls include one quarter lagged capital-assets ratio, ROA, deposits over total assets ratio and bank size. Standard errors, clustered at the bank level are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Robustness - single state banks

<i>Panel A: log(Loans)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MBS Ratio	0.053*** (0.007)				0.022*** (0.005)			
QE	0.102*** (0.007)	0.106*** (0.006)			0.069*** (0.005)	0.076*** (0.005)		
MBS Ratio X QE	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
State-Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	18,488	18,488	18,488	18,488	22,442	22,442	22,442	22,442
R ²	0.050	0.992	0.993	0.995	0.011	0.993	0.993	0.996
<i>Panel B: log(Reserves)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MBS Ratio	0.032*** (0.007)				0.013*** (0.005)			
QE	0.488*** (0.015)	0.491*** (0.015)			0.513*** (0.014)	0.518*** (0.013)		
MBS Ratio X QE	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
State-Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	18,488	18,488	18,488	18,488	22,442	22,442	22,442	22,442
R ²	0.049	0.912	0.920	0.922	0.034	0.891	0.901	0.902

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Eq.(1) using only bank that operate branches in a single state through the sample period. Dependent variables is log of total lending (panel A), and the log of total bank reserves (Panel B). In each panel columns 1-4 are all bank that their EIP exposure is below the sample median and columns 5-8 equal or above the median. Quarterly variables from 2019Q3 - 2021Q4. QE is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every quarter after 2020Q1. MBS Ratio is the bank average mbs-to-asset ratios averaged over the four quarters of 2019. The bank-level controls include one quarter lagged capital-assets ratio, ROA, deposits over total assets ratio and bank size. Standard errors, clustered at the bank level are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: Robustness - Alternative channels

<i>Panel A: log(Loans)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MBS Ratio X QE	0.001*	0.001*	0.001*	0.001	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.001***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
CAP X QE	-0.0002			-0.001	-0.001			-0.003***
	(0.002)			(0.002)	(0.001)			(0.001)
ROA X QE		-0.027*		-0.026*		0.003		0.003
		(0.014)		(0.015)		(0.010)		(0.009)
DEP X QE			-0.001	-0.001*			-0.001**	-0.002***
			(0.001)	(0.001)			(0.001)	(0.001)
Bank f.e.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bank Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	22,010	22,010	22,010	22,010	25,590	25,590	25,590	25,590
R ²	0.996	0.996	0.996	0.996	0.997	0.997	0.997	0.997
<i>Panel B: log(Reserves)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MBS Ratio X QE	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
CAP X QE	-0.003			-0.011***	-0.005*			-0.002
	(0.003)			(0.004)	(0.003)			(0.004)
ROA X QE		0.008		0.015		0.107***		0.111***
		(0.023)		(0.024)		(0.025)		(0.025)
DEP X QE			-0.004**	-0.008***			0.005***	0.005**
			(0.002)	(0.002)			(0.002)	(0.002)
Bank f.e.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bank Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	22,010	22,010	22,010	22,010	25,590	25,590	25,590	25,590
R ²	0.939	0.939	0.939	0.939	0.916	0.916	0.916	0.916

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Eq.(1) splitting the sample by banks exposure to the EIP, measured as the weighted mean (by number of branches) of the total EIP of all the states that a bank operates in. Dependent variables is log of total lending (panel A), and the log of total bank reserves (Panel B). In each panel columns 1-4 are all bank that their EIP exposure is below the sample median and columns 5-8 equal or above the median. Quarterly variables from 2019Q3 - 2021Q4. QE is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every quarter after 2020Q1. MBS Ratio is the bank average mbs-to-asset ratios averaged over the four quarters of 2019. All columns include bank fixed effect, time fixed effect and bank-level controls that include one quarter lagged capital-assets ratio, ROA, deposits over total assets ratio and bank size. Standard errors, clustered at the bank level are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: State-level results.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	ΔHPI		$\Delta Total Loans$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
EIP	7.241** (2.898)	6.733** (2.762)	9.067 (13.036)	8.032 (14.063)
<i>Treat</i> X EIP	1.241*** (0.453)	1.352*** (0.427)	3.651** (1.499)	3.732** (1.576)
State f.e.	Y	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	200	200	200	200
R ²	0.917	0.921	0.915	0.923

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Eq.(4). Dependent variable is the percent change in the house price index (columns 1-2), and the percent change in the amount of new mortgage lending (column 3-4). Time period is 2018-2021. EIP is the total Economic Impact Payments distributed to each state in every year. *Treat* equals to one if the state level MBS Ratio is equal or greater then the distribution mean. State level MBS Ratio is the weighted average of bank-specific MBS ratios weighted by the number of branches in each state averaged over 2018-2019. The state-level controls include the growth rate of real per capita GDP and the change in unemployment. Standard errors, clustered at the state level are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9: State-level results with continuous QE exposure measure

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	ΔHPI		$\Delta Total Loans$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
EIP	5.589*	4.841	4.165	2.421
	(3.212)	(3.032)	(13.529)	(14.693)
MBS Ratio X EIP	0.273***	0.297***	0.793***	0.681**
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.256)	(0.271)
State f.e.	Y	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	200	200	200	200
R ²	0.919	0.923	0.915	0.923

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Eq.(3). Dependent variable is the percent change in the house price index (columns 1-2), and the percent change in the amount of new mortgage lending (column 3-4). Time period is 2018-2021. EIP is the total Economic Impact Payments distributed to each state in every year. MBS Ratio is measured as the weighted average of bank-specific MBS ratios weighted by the number of branches in each state averaged over 2018-2019. The state-level controls include the growth rate of real per capita GDP and the change in unemployment. Standard errors, clustered at the state level are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C Appendix

C.1 A Simple Model of Liquidity Management

In this section, we present a simple model to illustrate how an exogenous increase in total reserve balances may impact banks' credit supply by altering banks' liquidity risk. The model largely builds on Andolfatto (2021) who modeled a monopolistic banking sector along the lines of Klein (1971).

Assume that on their asset side, banks issue loans and holds interest-bearing reserves at the central bank. Additionally, assume that banks' liabilities consist only of deposits. In each period, the monopolist bank chooses a deposit rate R^D which attracts a deposit supply of $D = s(R^D)$, a loan rate R^L which attracts a loan demand of $L = b(R^L)$ and takes the policy rate on reserves, R^m , as given

In each period, the bank faces liquidity costs, $c(L, D)$, where the cost function is assumed to be convex and strictly decreasing with D and increasing in L . That is, for a given level of loans, an increase in deposits reduces the liquidity costs with decreasing benefits and vice versa. Modeling such a cost function builds on an extensive theoretical literature where banks hold excess reserves to mitigate costs associated with liquidity risks due to unexpected deposit withdrawal (Ogawa 2007; Agénor and El Aynaoui 2010; Chang et al. 2014; Piazzesi and Schneider 2021; Bianchi and Bigio 2022).

While we do not explicitly model the mechanism which induces the liquidity cost, the general intuition could be described as follows. Assume each period a bank receives an idiosyncratic liquidity shock where some amount of deposits must be sent to other banks. If the withdrawal is larger than the bank's initial reserve holdings, the bank faces reserve deficiency and must raise funds by paying an adjustment cost (for example, by paying a penalty rate at the central bank discount window). Suppose we further assume that the adjustment cost is proportional to the deficiency such that a larger deficiency implies a higher adjustment cost and that the liquidity shock is upward bounded. In that case, it follows that: (i) For a given level of deposits, expanding credit increases the liquidity risk, and (2) Since the liquidity risk is upward bounded, for any level of credit, there is some level of deposits such that liquidity risk is minimized (additional deposits will not decrease the risk further).

Since both L and D are endogenously determined by the deposit and loan rate, it follows from the description above that the cost function for the monopolistic bank is strictly decreasing for both rates, with $c'_{RL} \leq 0$, $c'_{RD} \leq 0$, $c''_{RLRL} \geq 0$, and $c''_{RDRD} \geq 0$. Additionally, for any level of $L = b(R^L)$, there exist some level of $D = s(R^D)$ such that $c'_{RL} = c'_{RD} = 0$.

The profit maximization problem of a bank is, therefore, choosing in each period R^L and R^D to maximize profits subject to a resource constraint:

$$\max_{R^L, R^D} \{R^m m + R^L b(R^L) - R^D s(R^D) - c(R^L, R^D)\} \quad (5)$$

s.t. :

$$m + b(R^L) = s(R^D) \quad (6)$$

The first order conditions for the bank are:

$$R^L = \left[\frac{\chi(R^L)b(R^L)}{(\chi(R^L) - 1)b(R^L) + c'_{R^L}} \right] R^m \quad (7)$$

$$R^D = \left[\frac{\eta(R^D)s(R^D)}{(\eta(R^D) + 1)s(R^D) + c'_{R^D}} \right] R^m \quad (8)$$

where :

$$\chi(R^L) \equiv -R^L \frac{b'_{R^L}}{b(R^L)} > 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \eta(R^D) \equiv R^D \frac{s'_{R^D}}{s(R^D)} > 0 \quad (9)$$

The first-order conditions provide several insights. First, rates of return are ordered by: $R^D < R^m < R^L$. Second, we can distinguish between two possible regimes for liquidity management: an abundant reserve regime where $c'_{R^L} = 0$ and $c'_{R^D} = 0$, and a scarce reserve regime where $c'_{R^L} < 0$ and $c'_{R^D} < 0$. If reserves are abundant, the markup banks charge over R^m , and the markdown they pay under R^m depends only on the elasticity of loan demand and deposit supply. However, If reserves are scarce, an expansion of credit while holding total deposits constant implies a smaller c'_{R^L} and c'_{R^D} and thus a larger markup (and smaller markdown).

Therefore, a key implication of the model is that, holding all else equal, in a scarce reserve regime an increase in credit demand will induce a stronger increase in the markup over the credit rate relative to an abundant reserve regime and thus a *smaller* expansion of total credit.

C.2 Additional results and robustness tests

Table 10: Robustness - Single quarter MBS ratio measure

<i>Panel A: log(Loans)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MBS Ratio	0.081*** (0.007)				0.051*** (0.007)			
QE	0.112*** (0.006)	0.112*** (0.006)			0.081*** (0.004)	0.081*** (0.004)		
MBS Ratio X QE	0.0004 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.0005)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	22,010	22,010	22,010	22,010	25,590	25,590	25,590	25,590
R ²	0.086	0.995	0.995	0.996	0.044	0.995	0.995	0.997
<i>Panel B: log(Reserves)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MBS Ratio	0.057*** (0.007)				0.038*** (0.005)			
QE	0.513*** (0.014)	0.513*** (0.014)			0.534*** (0.013)	0.534*** (0.013)		
MBS Ratio X QE	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	22,010	22,010	22,010	22,010	25,590	25,590	25,590	25,590
R ²	0.077	0.934	0.937	0.939	0.048	0.909	0.914	0.916

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Eq.(1) splitting the sample by banks exposure to the EIP, measured as the weighted mean (by number of branches) of the total EIP of all the states that a bank operates in. Dependent variables is log of total lending (panel A), and the log of total bank reserves (Panel B). In each panel columns 1-4 are all bank that their EIP exposure is below the sample median and columns 5-8 equal or above the median. Quarterly variables from 2019Q3 - 2021Q4. QE is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every quarter after 2020Q1. MBS Ratio is the banks' mbs-to-asset ratio in 2019Q4. The bank-level controls include one quarter lagged capital-assets ratio, ROA, deposits over total assets ratio and bank size. Standard errors, clustered at the bank level are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11: Robustness - Using discrete QE exposure measure

<i>Panel A: log(Loans)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>MBS^{high}</i>	1.741***				1.030***			
	(0.087)				(0.068)			
QE	0.096***	0.096***			0.068***	0.068***		
	(0.009)	(0.009)			(0.006)	(0.006)		
<i>MBS^{high}</i> X QE	0.024**	0.024**	0.024**	0.015*	0.028***	0.028***	0.028***	0.015**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	14,580	14,580	14,580	14,580	17,160	17,160	17,160	17,160
R ²	0.210	0.995	0.995	0.997	0.123	0.995	0.995	0.997
<i>Panel B: log(Reserves)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>MBS^{high}</i>	1.019***				0.612***			
	(0.082)				(0.062)			
QE	0.458***	0.458***			0.511***	0.511***		
	(0.020)	(0.020)			(0.018)	(0.018)		
<i>MBS^{high}</i> X QE	0.171***	0.171***	0.171***	0.153***	0.015	0.015	0.015	-0.0002
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	14,580	14,580	14,580	14,580	17,160	17,160	17,160	17,160
R ²	0.117	0.943	0.946	0.947	0.071	0.916	0.920	0.922

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Eq.(1) splitting the sample by banks exposure to the EIP, measured as the weighted mean (by number of branches) of the total EIP of all the states that a bank operates in. Dependent variables is log of total lending (panel A), and the log of total bank reserves (Panel B). In each panel columns 1-4 are all bank that their EIP exposure is below the sample median and columns 5-8 equal or above the median. Quarterly variables from 2019Q3 - 2021Q4. QE is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every quarter after 2020Q1. *MBS^{high}* takes a value of one if the bank MBS Ratio is in the top tercile of the distribution to total assets and a value of zero if in the bottom tercile. The bank-level controls include one quarter lagged capital-assets ratio, ROA, deposits over total assets ratio and bank size. Standard errors, clustered at the bank level are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12: Robustness - Longer Sample period

<i>Panel A: log(Loans)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MBS Ratio	0.084*** (0.007)				0.053*** (0.007)			
QE	0.146*** (0.007)	0.146*** (0.007)			0.113*** (0.005)	0.113*** (0.005)		
MBS Ratio X QE	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	33,015	33,015	33,015	33,015	38,385	38,385	38,385	38,385
R ²	0.093	0.992	0.992	0.995	0.046	0.992	0.992	0.996
<i>Panel B: log(Reserves)</i>								
	Low EIP				High EIP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MBS Ratio	0.061*** (0.007)				0.039*** (0.005)			
QE	0.645*** (0.015)	0.645*** (0.015)			0.649*** (0.013)	0.649*** (0.013)		
MBS Ratio X QE	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
Bank f.e.	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Bank Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
Observations	33,015	33,015	33,015	33,015	38,385	38,385	38,385	38,385
R ²	0.097	0.922	0.927	0.930	0.075	0.890	0.897	0.901

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Eq.(1) splitting the sample by banks exposure to the EIP, measured as the weighted mean (by number of branches) of the total EIP of all the states that a bank operates in. Dependent variables is log of total lending (panel A), and the log of total bank reserves (Panel B). In each panel columns 1-4 are all bank that their EIP exposure is below the sample median and columns 5-8 equal or above the median. Quarterly variables from 2018Q2 - 2021Q4. QE in a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every quarter after 2020Q1. MBS Ratio is the bank average mbs-to-asset ratios averaged over the four quarters of 2019. The bank-level controls include one quarter lagged capital-assets ratio, ROA, deposits over total assets ratio and bank size. Standard errors, clustered at the bank level are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 13: Robustness State-level - Excluding South Dakota and Delaware

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	ΔHPI		$\Delta Total Loans$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
EIP	6.790** (2.959)	6.379** (2.837)	13.104 (12.742)	12.143 (13.639)
<i>Treat</i> X EIP	1.360*** (0.461)	1.446*** (0.436)	3.153** (1.505)	3.203** (1.558)
State f.e.	Y	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	192	192	192	192
R ²	0.920	0.924	0.920	0.926

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Eq.(4) after excluding South Dakota and Delaware. Dependent variable is the percent change in the house price index (columns 1-2), and the percent change in the amount of new mortgage lending (column 3-4). Time period is 2018-2021. EIP is the total Economic Impact Payments distributed to each state in every year. *Treat* equals to one if the state level MBS Ratio is equal or greater than the distribution mean. State level MBS Ratio is the weighted average of bank-specific MBS ratios weighted by the number of branches in each state averaged over 2018-2019. The state-level controls include the growth rate of real per capita GDP and the change in unemployment. Standard errors, clustered at the state level are reported in parenthesis.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 14: Robustness State-level - Adding COVID-19 control

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	ΔHPI		$\Delta Total Loans$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
EIP	7.061** (2.886)	6.631** (2.765)	8.487 (13.033)	7.830 (14.131)
Covid Cases	-0.00000 (0.00001)	-0.00001 (0.00001)	0.0002*** (0.00002)	0.0001*** (0.00002)
Covid Deaths	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)
<i>Treat</i> X EIP	1.196** (0.462)	1.323*** (0.436)	3.406** (1.535)	3.476** (1.628)
State f.e.	Y	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	200	200	200	200
R ²	0.918	0.921	0.918	0.926

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Eq.(4) after excluding South Dakota and Delaware. Dependent variable is the percent change in the house price index (columns 1-2), and the percent change in the amount of new mortgage lending (column 3-4). Time period is 2018-2021. EIP is the total Economic Impact Payments distributed to each state in every year. *Treat* equals to one if the state level MBS Ratio is equal or greater then the distribution mean. State level MBS Ratio is the weighted average of bank-specific MBS ratios weighted by the number of branches in each state averaged over 2018-2019. The state-level controls include the growth rate of real per capita GDP, the change in unemployment and the number of new COVID-19 cases and deaths per 1000 people that each state had in every year. Standard errors, clustered at the state level are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: State-level log-level regression results.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	<i>log(HPI)</i>		<i>log(Total Loans)</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
EIP	0.124*	0.118*	-0.178	-0.188
	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.108)	(0.116)
<i>Treat</i> X EIP	0.034***	0.035***	0.046***	0.048***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.015)
State f.e.	Y	Y	Y	Y
Time f.e.	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	200	200	200	200
R ²	0.991	0.991	0.998	0.998

Notes: This table presents the results of estimating Eq.(4) using log-levels in stead of growth rates. Dependent variable is the log of the house price index (columns 1-2), and the log of new mortgage lending (column 3-4). Time period is 2018-2021. EIP is the total Economic Impact Payments distributed to each state in every year. *Treat* equals to one if the state level MBS Ratio is equal or greater then the distribution mean. State level MBS Ratio is the weighted average of bank-specific MBS ratios weighted by the number of branches in each state averaged over 2018-2019. The state-level controls include the growth rate of real per capita GDP and the change in unemployment. Standard errors, clustered at the state level are reported in parenthesis. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.3 Data and variables definition

Bank-Level:

MBS ratio- the sum of held-to-maturity securities (using the amortized cost) and available-for-sale securities (using the fair value) to total assets to total assets. $(RCFDG300 + RCFDG303 + RCFDG304 + RCFDG307 + RCFDG308 + RCFDG311 + RCFDG312 + RCFDG315 + RCFDG316 + RCFDG319 + RCFDG320 + RCFDG323 + RCFDK142 + RCFDK145 + RCFDK146 + RCFDK149 + RCFDK150 + RCFDK153 + RCFDK154 + RCFDK157 + RCFDG379 + RCFDG380 + RCFDG381 + RCFDK197 + RCFDK198) / RCFD2170$. RCON for banks with only domestic offices.

Total Reserves- cash and balances due from depository institutions. The sum of RCFD0081 and RCFD0071. RCON for banks with only domestic offices.

Total Loans- loans and leases, net of unearned income, RCFD2122. RCON for banks with only domestic offices.

Total Commercial and Industrial Loans- sum of C&I loans to U.S. addressees (RCFD1763) and C&I loans to non-U.S. addressees (RCFD1764) for banks with foreign offices OR C&I loans as recorded in RCON1766 for banks without foreign offices.

Total Real Estate Loans- sum of all type of loan secured by real estate $(RCONF158 + RCONF159 + RCON1420 + RCON1797 + RCON5367 + RCONF5368 + RCON1460 + RCONF160 + RCONF161)$.

Capital assets Ratio (CAR)- total equity capita to total assets. $RCFD3210 / RCFD2170$. RCON for banks with only domestic offices.

Return on assets (ROA)- Net income to total assets. $RIAD4340 / RCFD2170$. RCON2170 for banks with only domestic offices.

Size- log of total assets where total assets is RCFD2170. RCON for banks with only domestic offices.

Deposit ratio- Deposits in foreign and domestic offices over assets. $(RCON2200 + RCFN2200) / RCFD2170$. RCON2170 for banks with only domestic offices.

Loans-to-Core Deposits Ratio- Total loans to the sum of transaction deposits, saving deposits and time deposits less than \$100,000. $RCFD2122 / (RCON2215 + RCON6810 + RCON0352 + RCON6648)$.

Non-Performing Loans Ratio- Loans past due 90 days or more and non-accruals non-performing loans to total loans . $(RCFD1407 + RCFD1403) / RCFD2122$. RCON for banks with only domestic offices.

State-Level:

House Price Index (HPI)- Year end (fourth quarter) of the state level house price index, not seasonally adjusted, Purchase-Only Indexes (Estimated using Sales Price Data), published quarterly by Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).

Population- Annual state population, as estimated by the BEA.

Real GDP- Annual state level Real GDP, millions of chained 2012 dollars, as estimated by the BEA.

Unemployment- Annual state level unemployment, percent, as estimated by the BLS.

Economic Impact Payments (EIP)- State level total Economic Impact Payments as published by the IRS. The EIP was distributed in three rounds: (i) \$1,200 per adult (\$500 per child) in April 2020; (ii) \$600 (per adult and child) in January 2021; (iii) \$1,400 (adult and child) in March 2021. Payments were sent by direct deposit to a bank account or by mail as a paper check or a debit card. We aggregate to annual level by using the total reported payment of the first round for 2020 and sum of the two other rounds for 2021.

Total Mortgage Loans - State level dollar value of mortgages in a given year as reported in HMDA database. Only includes conventional loans for one to four-family residential properties (other than manufactured housing) that were approved and originated.