How Exporters Grow*

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Abstract

We use customs microdata to distinguish between competing models of demand and customer base. We purge supply-side variation from the data by comparing quantities and prices across markets within a firm. Higher quantities on entry forecast survival in an export market, but survival is unrelated to initial prices. Conditioning on survival, there is economically and statistically significant growth of quantities within a firm-market, but no dynamics of prices. These facts are consistent with a model of the demand side of firm growth where entrants to a market learn about idiosyncratic demand through quantities, generating selective exit, while survivors grow by accumulating customer base through marketing and advertising. They present a challenge to models where firms learn about idiosyncratic demand through prices, and to models where current demand depends on lagged sales.

*Online appendix available at www.doireann.com. This work makes use of data from the Central Statistics Office, Ireland, which is CSO copyright. The possibility for controlled access to confidential micro data sets on the premises of the CSO is provided for in the Statistics Act 1993. The use of CSO data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the CSO in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the data. This work uses research data sets that may not exactly reproduce statistical aggregates published by the CSO. We thank the staff of the CSO for making this project possible. Expert research assistance was provided by Adrian Corcoran, Matt Shapiro and Anthony Priolo. Doireann Fitzgerald is grateful for financial support from the NSF under grant number 0647850. Yaniv Yedid-Levi is grateful for financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. We thank Costas Arkolakis, Kim Ruhl, James Tybout, Daniel Xu, and participants in the 2015 and 2016 NBER Summer Institute for comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.

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1 Introduction

Recent research makes demand and customer base central to the analysis of firm dynamics, business cycles, and international trade.\(^1\) Although much has been learned, there is as yet no consensus on how best to model the mechanisms through which firms’ demand and customer base grow. As a result, three different models are actively used in the literature. This state of affairs is unsatisfactory, as answers to several key questions differ across models. In this paper, we use customs microdata for Ireland to provide evidence on this issue. We show that the behavior of prices is inconsistent with two of the models commonly used. We also structurally estimate a simple model with idiosyncratic demand and customer base which is qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the behavior of both quantities and prices, thus providing a foundation on which the literature can build.

The three distinct approaches to modeling demand and customer base we refer to are as follows: (1) Firms learn from prices about their idiosyncratic demand in a market, leading to selection and sales growth, as firms exit markets with low demand while in markets with high demand they reduce markups to slide down their demand curves; (2) Demand depends on lagged sales, so firms expand in a market by first charging markups below their steady state level to shift out demand, then gradually increasing their markups as sales rise; (3) Demand depends on customer base, which firms acquire through non-price activities such as marketing and advertising.

These models differ in their predictions about certain moments of prices. Model (1) implies that conditioning on supply-side factors (such as marginal cost, quality, etc.), higher initial prices in a market should forecast survival. In addition, conditioning on survival as well as supply-side factors, growth in quantities in a market subsequent to entry should be accompanied by declining prices. Model (2) implies that conditioning on survival as well as supply-side factors, growth in quantities in a market subsequent to entry should be accompanied by increasing prices. Model (3) implies that as long as expenditure on marketing and advertising shifts demand, but does not affect its price elasticity, then conditional on both supply-side factors and survival, growth in quantities in a market subsequent to entry is possible without any price dynamics.

Customs microdata provide a very convenient environment within which to examine these predictions. This is because we observe quantities and prices, and can purge supply-

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side variation from the data under the twin assumptions that (a) demand is log-linear in the components of supply and demand that are common across markets, and (b) supply side factors do not vary across export markets within a firm and a product. We implement this by looking only at residual variation in quantities and prices after conditioning on firm-product-year fixed effects.

Conditional on these fixed effects, and on a set of fixed effects to control for market-specific factors that are common to all firms, we find that higher quantities in the year of entry to a market forecast longer survival in that market. In contrast, survival is unrelated to prices in the year of entry. Meanwhile, conditioning on survival, there are economically and statistically significant dynamics of quantities, but no dynamics of prices within a given firm, product, and market. In particular, in export spells which last at least 7 years, quantities grow on average more than 50% between the second and sixth year in a market, but this growth is accompanied by a zero average change in prices. We also find (as others have done), that the probability of exit is decreasing with age in a market. We perform a comprehensive set of robustness checks to confirm these facts. They hold across a range of manufacturing industries, across different export markets, and across firms of different size and ownership.

The behavior of prices that we document is clearly inconsistent with models (1) and (2).\(^2\) But both price and quantity facts are consistent with model (3). This suggests that marketing and advertising is important for acquiring and retaining customers, consistent with the substantial fraction of GDP that is devoted to these expenditures.\(^3\) We do not have data on marketing and advertising expenditures for our firms, but to demonstrate clearly the role they play, we structurally estimate a model of customer accumulation through marketing and advertising that can match all the quantity and price facts.

The model we estimate has the following features. We assume that entrants to a market must learn about market-specific idiosyncratic demand. But in contrast to model (1), we assume that firms set prices rather than quantities in the face of uncertainty about demand. They then learn through observing quantities whether their demand in a market is permanently high, or permanently low. Due to fixed costs of market participation, this generates selective exit from markets where firms learn through low initial quantities that they have low demand. Meanwhile, in markets where firms learn through high initial quantities that they have high idiosyncratic demand, they find it optimal to invest and grow by accumulat-

\(^2\)In addition, the behavior of prices is inconsistent with a “quality” (supply-side) explanation for within-market quantity growth, as this would imply that higher marginal cost, and hence higher prices, should accompany growth in quantities.

\(^3\)Arkolakis (2010) notes that marketing and advertising expenditures may account for up to 8% of GDP.
ing customer base through marketing and advertising. Assuming that demand is isoelastic in prices, and that customer base shifts demand, but does not change the price elasticity of demand, markups are flat as quantity grows. In addition to the elements just described, we also allow learning to be slow (i.e. slower than Bayesian learning), and we allow for both irreversibility and quadratic costs of adjusting investment in customer base.

We estimate this model by simulated method of moments. We target the quantity and exit moments from the data, since price moments are matched by construction. The model fits all moments remarkably well. It matches the relationship between initial quantities and survival; the growth of quantities in short and long export episodes; and the behavior of the exit hazard. By shutting down the elements of the model one-by-one, we show that it is indeed minimal, in the sense that all elements are necessary to match the facts. To match the quantity and exit moments quantitatively, there must be nontrivial costs of adjusting investment in customer base, and learning about idiosyncratic demand must be much slower than if firms were Bayesian.

To our knowledge, our paper is the first to use a comprehensive set of quantity and price moments to distinguish between competing models of demand and customer base. However we are not alone in investigating price dynamics. A series of recent papers document price moments using manufacturing census and customs data: some claim that prices are increasing with plant age or tenure in an export market, while others claim that they are decreasing. These claims are at odds with each other, and with our findings. We investigate the source of the differences between these results and ours by estimating the specifications used by these papers in our data. In contrast to our approach, these papers either mix supply-side with demand-side variation, or fail to separate selection from true dynamics, or both. We can replicate the results of these papers in our data. This suggests that purging supply-side variation and controlling for selection are both important in order to understand of what is going on on the demand side.

Models with demand and customer base are applied to a wide range of important issues. For example, Arkolakis et al. (2017) use model (1) to argue that firm entry may be inefficiently low due to learning about demand. Meanwhile, Foster et al. (2008, 2016) point to model (2) and argue that revenue-based TFP measures may systematically underestimate the contribution of entrants to productivity growth, because entrants have lower markups. Ravn et al. (2006) use model (2) to support a theory of business cycles with countercyclical

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4This includes Foster et al. (2008) who use plant census data for the US, and Bastos et al. (2017), Berman et al. (2015) and Piveteau (2016) who use customs data for Portugal and France. Foster et al. and Piveteau claim prices are increasing, while Bastos et al. and Berman et al. claim they are decreasing.
markups, while Hall (2014) points out that countercyclical markups are difficult to reconcile with the procyclicality of advertising. Drozd and Nosal (2012b) investigate the performance of model (2) in matching international business cycle comovements, and find it does poorly. Gourio and Rudanko develop a hybrid of models (2) and (3) to show that sluggish adjustment of customer base has important implications for firm responses to shocks, and for the relationship between investment and Tobin’s Q. Our findings therefore have applications in several fields, and provide a foundation upon which a wide range of future research can build.

The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we describe our data. In the third section, we describe our empirical strategy. In the fourth section, we describe our results on quantity, price, and exit moments. In the fifth section, we show that these moments allow us to distinguish between different models of demand and customer base. In the sixth section, we lay out our model. In the seventh section, we describe how we structurally estimate our model, and report our estimation results. In the eighth section, we report the results of some simulation exercises illustrating the quantitative importance of adjustment costs. The final section concludes.

2 Data description

We make use of two sources of confidential micro data made available to us by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) in Ireland: the Irish Census of Industrial Production (CIP) and Irish customs records. Here, we note the key points about each data set. The data are described in detail in the online appendix; the appendix also describes a third data set (the PRODCOM survey), which we use to obtain the number of products produced at the firm level and firm-product prices used in robustness checks.

2.1 Census of Industrial Production

The CIP is an annual census of manufacturing, mining, and utilities. Firms with three or more persons engaged are required to file returns.\(^5\) We make use of data for the years 1996-2009 and for NACE Revision 1.1 sectors 10-40 (manufacturing, mining, and utilities). Of the variables collected in the CIP, those we make use of in this paper are total revenue, employment, the country of ownership, and an indicator for whether the firm has multiple plants in Ireland.

\(^5\)Multiplant firms also fill in returns at the level of individual plants. We work with the firm-level data, since this is the level at which the match with customs records can be performed.
In constructing our sample for analysis, we drop firms with a zero value for total revenue or zero employees in more than half of their years in the sample. We perform some recoding of firm identifiers to maintain the panel dimension of the data, for example, in cases in which ownership changes.

2.2 Customs records

Our second source of data is customs records of Irish merchandise exports for the years 1996-2014. The value (euros) and quantity (tonnes)\(^6\) of exports are available at the level of the VAT number, the Combined Nomenclature (CN) eight-digit product, and the destination market (country), aggregated to an annual frequency. These data are matched by the CSO to CIP firms using a correspondence between VAT numbers and CIP firm identifiers, along with other confidential information. The online appendix provides additional information on this match.

A key feature of customs in the European Union is that data for intra-EU and extra-EU trade are collected separately, using two different systems called Intrastat and Extrastat. The threshold for mandatory reporting of intra-EU exports (635,000 euro per year in total shipments within the EU) is different from the threshold for extra-EU exports (254 euro per transaction).\(^7\) The high threshold for intra-EU exports likely leads to censoring of exports by small exporters to the EU. However it applies not at the market level, but to exports to the EU as a whole, and we observe many firms exporting amounts below the 635,000 euro threshold to individual EU markets.

An important feature of the customs data is that the eight-digit CN classification system changes every year. We concord the product-level data over time at the most disaggregated level possible following the approach of Pierce and Schott (2012) and Van Beveren et al. (2012). For our baseline analysis, we restrict attention to the period 1996-2009, for which we have CIP data in addition to customs data, and for this analysis we make use only of customs data that matches to a CIP firm. In some robustness checks, we make use of the full sample period, 1996-2014. When we do so, we do not condition on a CIP match. We perform the product concordance separately for the two different sample periods, as dictated by the Pierce and Schott approach.

As a result, we have annual data on value and quantity of exports at the firm-product-market level, where the product is defined at the eight-digit (concorded) level, and the

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\(^6\)The value is always available, but the quantity is missing for about 10% of export records.

\(^7\)Intra-EU exports below the threshold are recovered based on VAT returns. The destination market within the EU is not recorded for these returns.
Table 1: Summary statistics: Firms and exports, averages 1996-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mean number of firms per year</td>
<td>4748</td>
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<td>Mean employees</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean age (years)</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of firms foreign owned</td>
<td>0.12</td>
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<td>Share of multi-plant firms</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<td>Mean number of concorded products per firm</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of firms exporting</td>
<td>0.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exporter size premium (employees, mean)</td>
<td>1.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exporter size premium (revenue, mean)</td>
<td>1.85</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean export share conditional on exporting</td>
<td>0.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean number of markets per exporter</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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</table>

Notes: Statistics are for our cleaned data set of CIP firms. Firms are defined as exporters if they are matched to positive concorded product exports from customs data. Export intensity is calculated as total concorded product exports from customs divided by sales reported in the CIP. Values greater than 1 are replaced by 1. Source: CSO and authors’ calculations.

Table 2: Summary statistics: percentage of exporters by change in number of markets year to year

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<th>Change</th>
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</table>

Notes: Statistics are for our cleaned data set of CIP firms. Firms are defined as exporters if they are matched to positive concorded product exports from customs data. Export revenue is concorded product export revenue from customs data. There are 140 export markets. Source: CSO and authors’ calculations.

market refers to the destination country. We use this to construct a price (unit value) by dividing value by quantity, where available. In aggregate trade statistics, unit value data at the product level are notoriously noisy. However, conditioning on the exporting firm as well as the product considerably reduces this noise.

2.3 Summary statistics

Table 1 shows summary statistics on the firms in our data, focusing in particular on exporting behavior. Export participation is high, export intensity conditional on participation is high, and at least half of exporters participate in multiple markets (we observe 140 distinct export markets over the course of the panel). These facts are typical of small open European economies (see ISGEP (2008)). Apart from the relatively high rate of export participation and the high intensity of exporting conditional on participation, the broad facts about exporting are also similar to those documented for large developed countries such as the United States and France and for developing countries such as Colombia.
Entry and exit are not synchronized across different export markets within a given firm.8 This is illustrated in Table 2, which reports summary statistics on churn in the number of export markets from year to year. In any given year, on average 49% of exporters change the number of markets they participate in. This is a lower bound on churn, as some firms may keep the total number of export markets constant, while switching between markets. This churn induces within-firm-year variation in market tenure and completed export spell length, which we exploit in our empirical strategy.

3 Empirical strategy

The goal of our empirical analysis is to characterize moments of the data that can discriminate between competing models of demand and customer base. There are two key elements to our strategy: (1) we purge quantities and prices of variation due to supply-side factors, and (2), we separate variation that is due to selection from variation that is due to dynamics. In addition, we control for market-specific variation that is common across all firms. We focus throughout on conditional means, as these moments are sufficient to distinguish between models.

We purge the data of variation due to supply-side factors and that component of demand that is common across markets by focusing on moments of the data conditional on firm-product-year fixed effects. This controls for supply and the common component of demand under two assumptions. First, the marginal cost of production must be the same across all markets for a given firm, product, and year. Second, since we express quantities and prices in logs, demand must be log-linear in own price and in the common demand component.9

The issue with respect to selection is as follows. Suppose there is selection on idiosyncratic demand, i.e. firms systematically exit markets with low demand earlier than markets with high demand. Then if we pool across all export episodes, we will find an increasing relationship between exports and time since entry, even if there are no dynamics whatsoever within any given export episode. We deal with this issue by differentiating between export episodes according to how long they last. We then examine how initial conditions forecast survival, and also document dynamics conditioning on the ex-post duration of the export episode. This gives us information on the nature of selection, while also isolating true dynamics. This extends the approach of Ruhl and Willis (2016) to documenting exporter

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8This is consistent with Lawless (2009), who uses a different data set on Irish firms.
9Log-linearity is required for our strategy to purge supply-side factors from quantities, but is not required for our strategy to work for prices.
dynamics, and has some similarities with the approach of Altonji and Shakotko (1987) to dealing with selection in estimating the effect of job tenure on wages.

We use Table 3 to explain the intuition for our approach. The top panel gives a (fictitious) example of the pattern of participation of a firm-product pair in markets A through G over a period of six years. We define an export spell as a continuous episode of market participation, i.e. an episode in which there are positive exports in every year. Table 3 shows one export spell in all markets except market E, where there are two distinct export spells under our definition.

In the second panel, we show how we construct a variable we call market tenure. We set market tenure equal to 1 in the first year a firm exports a given product to a given market after not exporting in the previous period. Tenure is incremented by 1 in each subsequent year of continuous participation. If the firm-product exits a market for some period, market tenure is reset to 1 in the first subsequent year of participation (e.g., market E in year 4). Note that we do not observe market tenure if entry is censored (e.g., markets A and G in Table 3).

The third panel shows how we construct a variable we call spell length. If an export spell is neither left- nor right-censored, we observe completed spell length (markets B, C, D, E). If we observe zero exports for one or more years after some positive exports, any reentry is counted as part of a distinct export spell (e.g., market E). The fourth panel shows that by top-coding spell length at some number, we can assign a spell length to some right-censored spells (e.g., market F, where completed spell length is at least 3).

As Table 3 illustrates, there can be cross-sectional variation in both spell length and market tenure within a firm-product-year. By comparing initial conditions in spells which start in the same year, but have different completed market tenure (e.g. comparing markets B, D, and E in year 2) we can learn about the nature of selection on market-specific demand. By further examining how outcomes vary with market tenure within spells of a given length (e.g. markets B, C and F), we can separate true dynamics from the effect of selection. Our baseline strategy exploits two types of variation to identify dynamics: variation in market tenure over time within a given export spell, and variation in market tenure across spells of a given length within a firm-product-year.\footnote{In our baseline analysis we treat these “reentry” spells the same as “first entry” spells. In robustness checks, we relax this and treat them differently.}

\footnote{One potential concern with this latter dimension of variation is that it may confound selection in the timing of entry with dynamics. In robustness checks, we deal with this issue by adding firm-product-cohort fixed effects, or by expressing all outcomes relative to the outcome in the year of entry. Our findings are robust to these modifications.}
Table 3: Illustration of identifying variation in market tenure and spell length

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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</table>
3.1 Product revenue, quantity, price, and product-market exit

Mechanically, we implement our strategy as follows. Let $w_{ijk}^t$ be log revenue, log quantity, or log price. Let $\delta^k$ be a market dummy variable (our baseline results are robust to including market-year or product-market-year fixed effects). Let $c_{ij}^t$ be a firm-product-year fixed effect that controls for marginal cost. Let $a_{ijk}^t$ be a vector of indicator variables for firm $i$’s tenure in market $k$ with product $j$. Let $s_{ijk}^t$ be a vector of indicators for the length of the relevant spell. This indicator does not vary within a spell, but is indexed by $t$ to capture the fact that we may observe multiple export spells of different length for firm $i$, product $j$, and market $k$ over the period of our panel (e.g., market E in Table 3). We top-code both market tenure and spell length at seven years in our baseline specification. We drop spells whose length is right-censored at a level below the top-code.

Let $cens_{ijk}^t$ be an indicator for spells that are both left- and right-censored. Including these spells helps control for firm-product-year-specific factors. We then estimate:

$$w_{ijk}^t = \delta^k + c_{ij}^t + \beta'(a_{ijk}^t \otimes s_{ijk}^t) + cens_{ijk}^t + \varepsilon_{ijk}^t. \quad (1)$$

The symbol $\otimes$ indicates the Kronecker product. We do not observe tenures of greater than $s$ for a spell that lasts $s$ years, so the redundant interactions are dropped.

The vector $\beta$ contains the coefficients of interest. Appropriate linear combinations of the elements of $\beta$ allow us to characterize variation in initial log revenue, quantity, and price with completed spell length, and the evolution of log revenue, quantity, and price with market tenure over the lifetime of spells of different length.

To characterize the distribution of spell lengths, our second empirical exercise examines the hazard of exit. We adopt a similar strategy to the above to show how the average probability of exit varies with market tenure, exploiting again only variation within a firm-product-year to control for supply-side factors. Let $X_{ijk}^t$ be an indicator for participation of firm $i$ with product $j$ in market $k$ at date $t$. We then estimate the linear probability model:

$$\Pr[X_{i+1}^{ijk} = 0|X_i^{ijk} = 1] = \delta^k + c_{ij}^t + \beta'a_{ijk}^t + \varepsilon_{ijk}^t. \quad (2)$$

The terms $\delta^k$, $c_{ij}^t$ and $a_{ijk}^t$ are as above, and $\beta$ is again the vector of coefficients of interest. Linearity is clearly less defensible for exit than log-linearity for revenue, quantity and price.

---

12 Allowing the full range of market tenures and spell lengths would force us to drop all right-censored spells, would not allow us to separately identify the impact of market tenure and spell length for the longest spells, and would also confound cohort effects with the impact of these variables. Using our full panel of customs data, which lasts for 19 years, we show that our key results are robust to top-coding at 10 years.
But our estimates do not purport to be structural. All that we ask is that they characterize average behavior in a way that is informative for distinguishing between models.

### 3.2 Market revenue, number of products, and market exit

At the firm-market level, we observe revenue and the number of products a firm sells to a destination. This allows us to characterize the extent to which overall revenue dynamics depend on dynamics in the number of products.

The construction of market tenure and spell length at the firm-market level is analogous to the approach at the firm-product-market level. Let $w_{it}^k$ be log revenue or log number of products. Let $\delta^k$ be a market dummy variable. Let $c_i^t$ be a firm-year fixed effect. Let $a_{it}^k$ be a vector of indicator variables for firm $i$’s tenure in market $k$. Let $s_{it}^k$ be a vector of indicators for the total length of the relevant spell. Let $cens_{it}^k$ be an indicator for spells that are both left- and right-censored. We then estimate:

$$w_{it}^k = \delta^k + c_i^t + \beta' (a_{it}^k \otimes s_{it}^k) + cens_{it}^k + \varepsilon_{it}^k. \quad (3)$$

Appropriate linear combinations of the elements of $\beta$ allow us to characterize variation in initial revenue and number of products with completed spell length, and the evolution of log revenue and number of products with market tenure over the lifetime of spells of different length.

We also characterize the distribution of spell lengths at the firm-market level. Let $X_{it}^k$ be an indicator for participation of firm $i$ in market $k$ at date $t$. We then estimate:

$$\Pr [X_{t+1}^k = 0|X_{t}^k = 1] = \delta^k + c_i^t + \beta' a_{it}^k + \varepsilon_{it}^k. \quad (4)$$

### 4 Empirical findings

#### 4.1 Product revenue, quantity, price, and product-market exit

The first three columns of Table 4 report results for the baseline estimation of equation (1), with log revenue, log quantity, and log price in turn as the dependent variable.\(^{13}\) The omitted category in all regressions is export spells which last exactly one year. The log of

---

\(^{13}\)Table A.5 in the online appendix compares summary statistics on the firm-years included in this analysis with summary statistics for all firm-years in our data. Exporters included in the analysis are bigger, more export-intensive, and export to more destinations than the average exporter.
the dependent variable for each of these spells is hence normalized to 0. In the table, we organize our results into initial values conditional on spell length and within-spell trajectories normalizing the start of each spell to 0. Figures 1, 2, and 3, graph the trajectories of revenues, quantities and prices implied by taking the exponential of the relevant sums of coefficients from Table 4.  

We have four key findings on quantities and prices: (1) Higher initial quantities predict longer export spells. For spells lasting between one and four years, all pairwise comparisons of initial quantities are statistically different. (2) Initial prices do not predict export spell length. (3) Quantities grow dramatically in the first five years of export spells that last at least seven years. This growth is statistically significant up to a horizon of four years and is not driven purely by part-year effects in the first year (i.e. there is economically and statistically significant growth between years 2 and 4). (4) Within successful export spells, up to a horizon of six years, there are no statistically or economically significant dynamics

\[\text{We graph the standard errors for all revenue and quantity trajectories, but for price trajectories, we graph only the standard errors on the longest spell to make the figure easier to read. None of the points on the price trajectories are significantly different from 1.}\]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obs. level</th>
<th>Firm-product-market</th>
<th>Firm-market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dep. var. (ln)</td>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spell lgth</td>
<td>Spell intercept</td>
<td>Spell intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>0.51 (0.02)**</td>
<td>0.52 (0.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>0.76 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.76 (0.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>0.95 (0.05)**</td>
<td>0.95 (0.05)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1.07 (0.06)**</td>
<td>1.08 (0.07)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>1.13 (0.08)**</td>
<td>1.09 (0.08)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7+ years</td>
<td>1.39 (0.05)**</td>
<td>1.39 (0.05)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cens</td>
<td>3.66 (0.03)**</td>
<td>3.70 (0.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mkt tenure</td>
<td>2-year spell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>0.44 (0.04)**</td>
<td>0.45 (0.05)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years</td>
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<td>0.55 (0.06)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>0.55 (0.06)**</td>
<td>0.60 (0.06)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7+ years</td>
<td>0.55 (0.06)**</td>
<td>0.55 (0.06)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mkt tenure</td>
<td>3-year spell</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>0.63 (0.09)**</td>
<td>0.62 (0.09)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>0.70 (0.09)**</td>
<td>0.69 (0.09)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>0.57 (0.09)**</td>
<td>0.61 (0.09)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mkt tenure</td>
<td>4-year spell</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>0.74 (0.11)**</td>
<td>0.78 (0.11)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>0.87 (0.11)**</td>
<td>0.95 (0.11)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>0.85 (0.11)**</td>
<td>0.92 (0.11)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>0.71 (0.11)**</td>
<td>0.75 (0.11)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>0.12 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.14 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mkt tenure</td>
<td>5-year spell</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>0.85 (0.06)**</td>
<td>0.88 (0.06)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>1.16 (0.06)**</td>
<td>1.20 (0.06)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>1.31 (0.06)**</td>
<td>1.34 (0.06)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1.34 (0.06)**</td>
<td>1.37 (0.06)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>1.30 (0.06)**</td>
<td>1.33 (0.07)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7+ years</td>
<td>1.28 (0.06)**</td>
<td>1.35 (0.06)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed effects</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
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<td>Firm-yr</td>
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<td>No</td>
</tr>
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<td>Market</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
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<td>312952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rsq</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>rsq-adj</td>
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<td>0.69</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: In the first column, the sample is restricted to firm-product-market-years for which quantity data are available. Dependent variable is in turn log revenue, log quantity, and log unit value at the firm-product-market-year level, and log revenue and log number of products at the firm-market-year level. Full set of firm-product-year and market effects included in firm-product-market-year regressions. Full set of firm-year and market effects included in firm-market-year regressions. Omitted category is spells that last one year. Robust standard errors calculated. ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Source: CSO and authors’ calculations.
Figure 2: Firm-product-market quantity by completed spell length and market tenure

Notes: Figure shows evolution of quantities at the firm-product-market level with market tenure, allowing trajectories to differ by export spell length. Trajectories are conditional on firm-product-year and market effects. 95% confidence intervals are plotted. Source: CSO and authors’ calculations.

Figure 3: Firm-product-market price by completed spell length and market tenure, different scale

Notes: Figure shows evolution of prices at the firm-product-market level with market tenure, allowing trajectories to differ by export spell length. Trajectories are conditional on firm-product-year and market effects. 95% confidence interval for spells of 7+ years is plotted. Source: CSO and authors’ calculations.
Table 5: Exit hazard

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Market tenure</th>
<th>Firm-prod-mkt</th>
<th>Firm-mkt</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.00)**</td>
<td>-0.16 (0.00)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>-0.20 (0.00)**</td>
<td>-0.22 (0.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>-0.24 (0.00)**</td>
<td>-0.25 (0.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>-0.25 (0.01)**</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>-0.24 (0.01)**</td>
<td>-0.27 (0.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7+ years</td>
<td>-0.24 (0.00)**</td>
<td>-0.26 (0.01)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fixed effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Firm-prod-yr</th>
<th>Firm-yr</th>
<th>Market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>381452</td>
<td>103297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rsq</td>
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<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rsq-adj</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for exit in the next period. Full set of firm-product-year and market effects included at the firm-product-market-year level. Full set of firm-year and market effects included at the firm-market-year level. Omitted category is market tenure equal to one year. Robust standard errors calculated. ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.

Source: CSO and authors’ calculations.

The first column of Table 5 reports results for the baseline estimation of the firm-product-market exit equation, i.e. equation (2). Figure 4 illustrates these findings. The probability of exit is initially decreasing in market tenure and then flattens out after four years in a market.

4.2 Market revenue, number of products, and market exit

The fourth and fifth columns of Table 4 report the results from the baseline estimation of equation (3), with log revenue and log number of products as the dependent variable in turn. These results are illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. The evolution of revenue at the firm-market level is qualitatively very similar to the evolution of revenue at the firm-product-market level, though the trajectories are somewhat steeper, reflecting the fact that the number of products per market also evolves with market tenure. Focusing on the longest spells, 70-80% of the growth of revenue at the market level along the growth path is accounted for by within-product growth in revenue, indicating that the within-product margin is of

Note that the sample of firms included in columns 4 and 5 includes some firms not present in column 1, as the revenue equation at the product level drops the 10% of observations for which quantity is not available.

This is consistent with the findings of Hottman et al. (2016) on the importance of the product extensive margin.
Figure 4: Exit probability and market tenure: Firm-product-market and firm-market

Notes: Figure shows reduction in probability of exit at the firm-market and firm-product-market levels with compared to probability of exit in the first year in a market. Trajectories are conditional on firm-year and market and firm-product-year and market effects, respectively. 95% confidence intervals are plotted. Source: CSO and authors’ calculations.

first-order importance in explaining export growth.

The second column of Table 5 reports the results from the baseline estimation of the firm-market exit equation (4). Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of the probability of exit with market tenure at the market level, with the corresponding evolution at the product-market level for comparison. The evolution of exit at the market level is very similar to the evolution of exit at the product-market level, though the probability of exit continues falling until the firm is five years in the market.\footnote{The unconditional probability of exit in the first year is substantially higher at the firm-product-market level than at the firm-market level (62\% vs. 45\%).}

4.3 Robustness

We make extensive checks of both specification robustness and robustness to various cuts of the data. We describe key findings here, and refer to specific tables in the online appendix where the full set of results (including some not described here) is reported.
Figure 5: Firm-market revenue by completed spell length and market tenure

Notes: Figure shows evolution of revenue at the firm-market level with market tenure, allowing trajectories to differ by export spell length. Trajectories are conditional on firm-year and market effects. Source: CSO and authors’ calculations.

Figure 6: Number of products per market by completed spell length and market tenure

Notes: Figure shows evolution of number of products at the firm-market level with market tenure, allowing trajectories to differ by export spell length. Trajectories are conditional on firm-year and market effects. Source: CSO and authors’ calculations.
4.3.1 Specification robustness

Our results are qualitatively and quantitatively almost unchanged when we include market-year fixed effects (Tables A.6 and A.7 and Figures A.4, A.5 and A.6) or product-market-year fixed effects (Tables A.8 and A.9 and Figures A.6, A.7 and A.8) as appropriate.

We restrict our analysis to the subsample of products and firms for which a second measure of quantity (other than tonnes) is reported, constructing quantities and unit values using this alternative measure (Table A.10 and Figures A.9 and A.10). For this subsample, which is 1/6 of the baseline sample, we find that lower initial prices predict that export spells last longer than one year. However, all other results are unchanged.

We vary the level at which spell lengths and market tenure are top-coded, in the range 5 to 8 in our 14-year baseline sample, and in the range 7 to 10 in the 19-year sample that does not require a match between a firm in the customs data and a firm in the Census of Industrial Production. The key results are qualitatively unchanged (a subset of these results are reported in the appendix in Tables A.11 through A.17 and Figures A.11 through A.16). However, there is some evidence that prices drop below their initial levels in the later years of the longest export spells (10+ years in duration). This is at a point when there are no longer any dynamics in quantities.

One concern about our baseline specification is that there may be some dimension of idiosyncratic demand that is observable to firms, but not to us, and firms may choose to enter markets that are more attractive along this dimension earlier than less attractive markets. Since we make use of cross sectional variation in market tenure in spells of the same length to identify dynamics, this kind of selection in the timing of entry could lead us to infer within-spell growth in quantities where there is none. To address this, we estimate two alternative specifications. First we augment the baseline specification with firm-product-cohort fixed effects (Tables A.18 and A.19 and Figures A.17, A.18 and A.19). Second, we normalize the dependent variable by the value in the first year of the relevant spell (Table A.20 and Figures A.20 and A.21). The first approach allows us to estimate differences in initial quantities and prices across spells of different length, while the second does not. We find that the growth of quantities in the longest spells is marginally lower under these specifications, but otherwise our findings are both qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged.

4.3.2 First and subsequent markets, products and spells

Prompted by the possibility of a role for learning about demand in explaining post-entry export dynamics, several papers use micro data on exports to examine the difference in dy-
namics between “firsts” (first markets, first products, first spells) and “subsequents” (subsequent markets, subsequent products, subsequent spells). We perform similar cuts of our data.

We allow trajectories to differ across export spells based on the number of markets the firm exported to at the beginning of the spell: a total of three or fewer markets versus four or more markets (Tables A.21, A.22 and A.23 and Figures A.22, A.23 and A.24). Identification of the coefficients of interest comes from within-firm-product-year or within-firm-market-year variation across markets, so restricting to the case where there are few markets reduces the precision of the estimates. However, the key stylized facts are qualitatively replicated for both sets of spells. The one statistically significant difference is that the probability of exit falls more with market tenure in first markets than in subsequent markets.

We allow trajectories to differ between first products and subsequent products, where a product is “first” if on entry, the firm does not export any other products to that market, and is “subsequent” if on entry, the firm already exports at least one product to that market (Tables A.24, A.25 and A.26 and Figures A.25, A.26 and A.27). The key stylized facts are qualitatively replicated for both sets of spells. Quantitatively, the only difference is that in successful spells, the growth of quantities is somewhat steeper for first products than subsequent products.

We allow trajectories to differ between first spells in a firm-product-market and subsequent or reentry spells in the same firm-product-market (Tables A.27, A.28 and A.29 and Figures A.28, A.29 and A.30). The estimates for subsequent spells are noisy, as there are relatively few of these spells. However, the key stylized facts are qualitatively replicated for both sets of spells. The only statistically significant difference is that the probability of exit in year 1 is lower (by about 7%) in subsequent spells than in first spells.

4.3.3 Firm and product characteristics

We also examine robustness to splitting the sample by firm and product characteristics. We first estimate separate trajectories for domestic-owned and foreign-owned firms (Tables A.30, A.31, A.32 and A.33 and Figures A.31, A.32 and A.33). Although they account for only 10% of firms in the CIP, more than half of the observations in our baseline sample come from foreign-owned firms, as they are bigger and more export-oriented than domestic-owned firms. The key stylized facts are qualitatively replicated for both sets of firms. The only statistically significant difference is that growth in quantities in the initial years of successful export spells is higher in foreign-owned than in domestic-owned firms.
We estimate different trajectories based on firm size (as measured by employment) at the time of firm-product-market or firm-market entry (Tables A.34 through A.42 and Figures A.34 through A.42). The key stylized facts are qualitatively replicated for small and large firms. The only difference is that growth in quantities in the initial years of successful export spells is higher in large than small firms. This does not depend on the threshold for classifying a firm as large.

We estimate separate sets of trajectories for different industry groups: consumer food products; consumer nonfood nondurables; consumer durables; intermediates and capital goods (Tables A.43 through A.52 and Figures A.43, A.44 and A.45). This categorization is based on the NACE Revision 1.1 three-digit sector of the firm.\textsuperscript{18} Estimates for consumer nonfood nondurables and consumer durables are noisy, as there are relatively few firms in these industries.\textsuperscript{19} The key stylized facts are qualitatively replicated for all industry groups.

We use a concordance between the Rauch (1999) classification of goods as homogeneous, reference-priced, or differentiated, and the HS six-digit product classification, to apply the Rauch classification at the product level in our data. This allows us to classify products for 89% of our baseline estimation sample. Of these, about 5% are classified as homogeneous, 16% as reference-priced, and the remainder as differentiated. We then estimate separate sets of trajectories for the three groups of products (Tables A.53 through A.58 and Figures A.46, A.47 and A.48). The key stylized facts are qualitatively replicated for all product types.

### 4.4 Relation to the empirical literature

There are now two issues to resolve. First, is Ireland special, and are our results driven by some special feature of the Irish data? Second, how do our findings relate to a series of conflicting claims about price dynamics in the related literature?

To show that the Irish data is not unusual, we note that we can replicate the findings of a large body of literature working with firm and customs micro data for other countries. As mentioned above, summary statistics on the cross-sectional dimension of exporting in our data are in line with those for other small open European economies. Our findings on the post-entry dynamics of revenues and exit are similar to those in the previous literature, (e.g., Eaton et al. (2008), Eaton et al. (2014), Ruhl and Willis (2016)). Using our data, we can also replicate a number of facts about the behavior of prices (or more precisely, unit values) in customs data for other countries. In Fitzgerald et al. (2017), we show that the degree

\textsuperscript{18} The assignment of three-digit sectors to industry groups is detailed in the online appendix.

\textsuperscript{19} Pharmaceuticals, a key industry for Ireland in terms of export value, though not employment, is categorized as a consumer nonfood nondurable.
of pricing-to-market in our data is very similar to that for other countries (e.g. France, as shown by Berman et al. (2012)). In the online appendix to this paper (Table A.63), we show that prices vary with destination market characteristics just as in the literature surveyed in Harrigan et al. (2015).

However, our findings on the absence of price dynamics contrast with those in a number of related papers that claim to show evidence of price dynamics. Using customs data for France, Berman et al. (2015) claim that prices are decreasing with tenure in a market.\(^{20}\) Bastos et al. (2017) use Portuguese customs data, and also claim that prices are decreasing with tenure. Piveteau (2016) uses French customs data, and claims that prices are increasing with tenure in a market.\(^{21}\) Foster et al. (2008) use manufacturing census data on plants in a narrow set of commodity-like sectors, and also claim an increasing relationship between prices and plant age.

These contrasting results may be due to the fact that these authors work with empirical specifications which are different from each other, as well as from our specification. There are two key points of difference: (1) the treatment of supply-side variation, and (2) the approach to separating selection from dynamics. In our baseline specification, we purge the data of variation that is due to supply-side factors by looking at price moments conditional on firm-product-year fixed effects. While Berman et al. purge the data of supply-side variation using a similar approach to ours, Bastos et al., Piveteau, and Foster et al. mix supply-side and demand-side variation in their baseline specifications. As regards selection, in our baseline specification, we condition on survival to be able to separate true within-firm-product-market dynamics from selection on prices. While Piveteau also conditions on survival in his baseline specification, Berman et al., Bastos et al. and Foster et al. do not.

To investigate the hypothesis that the differences between the different sets of results are driven by specification differences, we estimate the Berman et al. and Piveteau specifications in our customs data, and a specification that resembles that of Foster et al. using PRODCOM data at the firm-product level. The results from these exercises are consistent with the findings of these various authors. When we estimate the Berman et al. specification, we find a negative (though not significant) relationship between prices and tenure (Table A.64). When we estimate the Piveteau specification, we find a positive (though not significant) relationship between prices and tenure (Table A.65).\(^{22}\) When we estimate the Foster et al. specification, we find that prices are flat with respect to

\(^{20}\)Berman et al.’s point estimates are very similar to ours, but their standard errors are smaller.

\(^{21}\)Unlike us, Bastos et al., Berman et al., and Piveteau do not investigate the relationship between initial prices and survival.

\(^{22}\)Moreover, in robustness analysis, Berman et al. and Piveteau both estimate specifications that resemble one of our robustness analyses (Table A.20). In these exercises, they find that prices are flat with respect to
specification using PRODCOM data, we find that prices are significantly higher in firms that have been selling a product for some years than in firms that have just started selling the same product (Table A.66).

We suspect that the empirical treatment of both supply-side variation and selection matters because selection and dynamics on the supply side are associated with quite different price behavior from selection and dynamics on the demand side. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that when we estimate the Foster et al. specification, we find (as they do) that lower prices forecast exit. This contrasts sharply with the fact that prices do not forecast survival when we purge supply-side variation from the data. It is also supported by the fact that the Berman et al. specification yields results that are quite close to ours despite not separating selection from dynamics, as their approach purges supply-side variation from the data.

5 What our findings say about models of demand

As noted in the introduction, there are several alternative approaches to modeling demand and customer base in the literature on macroeconomics and international trade. We now compare the predictions of the most prominent of these models with our evidence about the behavior of quantities and prices. To do this it will be useful to have some notation. Let firm $i$’s demand in market $k$ at time $t$ be given by

$$Q_{it} = d(P_{it}, \varepsilon_{it}, D_{it}).$$

(5)

$Q_{it}$ is the quantity firm $i$ sells in market $k$ at date $t$. $P_{it}$ is the price the firm charges to buyers from $k$. $\varepsilon_{it}$ is a shock, idiosyncratic to the firm and the market, which shifts demand conditional on price. It is exogenous to the firm. $D_{it}$ is a variable that is firm- and market-specific, and which shifts demand conditional on price, but which depends on actions taken by the firm at $t$ or in previous periods. We refer to it as “customer base.”

23 For the purpose of illustration, we abstract from the product dimension, and from factors such as aggregate demand and the aggregate price level in market $k$ that are controlled for by market, market-year, or product-market-year fixed effects in our regressions.
5.1 Learning from prices

This model is used in the literature on firm dynamics, and in the literature on international trade. In this model, there is no endogenous component to idiosyncratic demand: $D_{ik}^t = 0$. Both selection and dynamics result from the fact that idiosyncratic demand $\varepsilon_{ik}^t$ has some persistent component, and is unobserved before firms choose market participation or other actions. By participating in a market, firms can update the information they use to form expectations about future idiosyncratic demand. Crucially, in the face of uncertainty about $\varepsilon_{ik}^t$, firms are assumed to set quantities, and learn by observing realized prices. As a result, in markets where $\varepsilon_{ik}^t$ is high, high prices are observed after entry, and firms infer that the probability of having high demand in those markets in the future is high. They respond optimally by increasing quantities, thereby driving prices down as they move along their demand curve. In contrast, in markets where $\varepsilon_{ik}^t$ is low, post-entry prices are low. Firms infer that the probability of having high demand in the future is low. In the presence of fixed costs of participating in a market, low prices thus lead to early exit.

To sum up, in this model, high initial prices forecast survival, while low initial prices forecast early exit. Meanwhile, in successful episodes of market participation (i.e. episodes where exit is not observed), on average prices fall as quantities rise, with the relationship between quantities and prices being governed by the price elasticity of demand. Both of these predictions are inconsistent with what we find in the data. Robustly, we find that initial prices do not forecast survival, while initial quantities do. Moreover, in our baseline results, conditional on survival, there are no statistically or econometrically significant dynamics in prices.

The fact that in the data, quantities, not prices, forecast survival suggests that firms may indeed face uncertainty about idiosyncratic demand, but that in the face of uncertainty, they set prices rather than quantities. This case has not received much attention in the literature, possibly because it cannot explain growth in quantities: If firms set prices, in markets with high idiosyncratic demand, they observe high initial quantities, learn thereby that future demand will be high, and find it optimal to (weakly) raise prices and reduce quantities sold in response. Only in the limiting case of isoelastic demand, where desired markups do not depend on beliefs about future demand, are there are no dynamics of either prices or quantities.

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24 See Arkolakis et al. (2017), Bastos et al. (2017) and Berman et al. (2015).
25 Firms do not anticipate price dynamics, but there are dynamics in realized prices because of dynamics in beliefs.
26 We show this formally in section 3 of the online appendix.
5.2 Current demand depends on lagged sales

This model has generated some interest in the literature on business cycles. It has also been used in the literature on firm dynamics and international trade. In this model, customer base $D_{t}^{ik}$ is increasing in lagged sales in the market, i.e. $P_{t-1}^{ik}Q_{t-1}^{ik}$. This generates a tradeoff between maximizing profits today, and maximizing profits tomorrow. Firms with below-steady-state sales in a market expand in that market by first charging low markups to generate high sales. Demand shifts out as a result, and as sales converge to their steady state, markups are gradually increased. So according to this model, increasing quantities should be accompanied by increasing markups. While it is straightforward to allow for idiosyncratic demand $\varepsilon_{t}^{ik}$ and selection due to fixed costs of market participation in this model, without taking a stand on how sales on entry to a market are determined (i.e. $D_{t}^{ik}$ when $P_{t-1}^{ik}Q_{t-1}^{ik} = 0$), the model is silent on whether initial quantities or prices should forecast survival.

The prediction that increasing markups accompany increasing quantities is clearly inconsistent with what we find in the data. In our baseline results, conditional on survival there are no statistically or economically significant dynamics in prices.

5.3 Customer base is acquired through marketing and advertising

This model is used in the literature on international trade and business cycles. In this model, demand depends on market-specific customer base $D_{t}^{ik}$, and firms can acquire customer base through non-price activities such as marketing and advertising in the relevant market. Dynamics can be introduced by assuming that customer base can be accumulated (i.e. $D_{t}^{ik}$ is increasing in $D_{t-1}^{ik}$), and investment in customer base is subject to adjustment costs. In the formulations generally used in the literature, customer base does not affect the price elasticity of demand. As a result, by engaging in marketing and advertising, firms can shift demand and increase quantities without having any impact on optimal markups. It is straightforward to allow for idiosyncratic demand, $\varepsilon_{t}^{ik}$, and selection in this model. Firms want to accumulate higher customer base $D_{t}^{ik}$ in markets with high idiosyncratic demand $\varepsilon_{t}^{ik}$. Depending on what firms know about idiosyncratic demand on entry, this can generate a positive relationship between initial quantities and subsequent quantity growth, as we

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27 See e.g. Ravn et al. (2006), Gilchrist et al. (2017), and Gourio and Rudanko (2014).
28 See Foster et al. (2016) and Piveteau (2016).
29 See Arkolakis (2010, 2016), Eaton et al. (2011), and Eaton et al. (2014).
30 See Drozd and Nosal (2012a) and Gourio and Rudanko (2014).
explore in the next section.

The predictions of this model - under the assumption that customer base does not affect the price elasticity of demand - are consistent with our finding that there are statistically and economically significant dynamics of quantities that are not accompanied by dynamics in prices. We do not have direct evidence of the role of marketing and advertising in within-market growth. We do not even have data on expenditures on marketing and advertising at the firm level. But we can certainly infer from the fact that a non-trivial share of GDP is devoted to marketing and advertising that firms think these activities are valuable for the bottom line.

5.4 Quality

Finally, in a model where firms tailor quality to the market, dynamics in quality could generate market-specific dynamics in quantities. But such a model would predict that higher quantities should be accompanied by higher prices, since quality is costly to produce. This is inconsistent with the joint behavior of quantities and prices in our data. This does not lead us to reject the idea that quality heterogeneity is important. Rather, we do not think there is much evidence that within-firm market-specific quality heterogeneity can explain our results. Across firms, quality heterogeneity may play a key role.

6 A model of market-specific demand

To demonstrate clearly the role of marketing and advertising, we now build the simplest possible model of the demand side which can match quantity, price, and exit moments. It is straightforward to build more a more complicated model to match even more moments, but for our purposes, this would obscure rather than clarify the key mechanisms. The model can be summarized as follows: Entry is random. Entrants to a market set prices, and learn through quantities about idiosyncratic demand, generating selective exit. Meanwhile, survivors grow by accumulating customer base through non-price actions such as marketing and advertising. Both idiosyncratic demand and customer base shift total demand, but do not affect the price elasticity of demand, so desired markups are constant. In addition to these basic elements, for quantitative purposes, we also allow learning to be slow (i.e. slower than Bayesian learning), and we allow for both irreversibility and quadratic costs of adjusting

\[ \text{By “quality” we mean something which both increases costs of production, and shifts demand conditional on price.}\]
investment in customer base.\textsuperscript{32}

We model a single-product firm, where the only channel through which decisions across different markets are interdependent is through a common marginal cost of production. Firm $i$ is characterized by marginal cost $C^i$, the same in all markets. The firm observes $C^i$ before making any decisions at date $t$, and knows the process from which marginal cost is drawn.

As illustrated by Table 2, entry is not perfectly synchronized across markets within the firm. Moreover, there is a good deal of steady state churn in the number of markets a firm participates in. This suggests an idiosyncratic dimension to entry and exit at the firm-market level. To capture this in the simplest possible way, we assume that firm $i$ faces stochastic sunk costs ($S^i_k$) and per-period fixed costs ($F^i_k$) of participating in market $k$ at date $t$. The firm observes these costs before deciding to participate at date $t$, and knows the distributions from which they are drawn.

Demand for firm $i$ in market $k$ depends on its own price $P^i_k$, on customer base $D^i_k$, and on idiosyncratic demand $\varepsilon^i_k$. Demand takes the form:\textsuperscript{33}

$$Q^i_k = (P^i_k)^{-\theta} (D^i_k)^{\alpha} \exp(\varepsilon^i_k).$$

(6)

Note that neither idiosyncratic demand nor customer base affect the price elasticity of demand ($\theta$). If $\alpha \in (0, 1)$, demand is increasing in customer base, but at a diminishing rate. In this case there is a finite positive steady state for $D^i_k$.

Customer base accumulates as follows:

$$D^i_k = (1 - \delta) X^i_{t-1} D^i_{t-1} + A^i_k,$$

(7)

where $X^i_{t-1} \in \{0, 1\}$ is an indicator for participation in market $k$ by firm $i$ at date $t$, $A^i_k$ is investment in customer base, and $\delta$ is the depreciation rate of customer base.\textsuperscript{34} Investment

\textsuperscript{32}It is possible to construct an alternative rationalization of the facts based on a price-taking firm that faces marginal costs of distributing goods that are increasing in the quantity sold. This explanation has a very similar flavor to the one we pursue.

\textsuperscript{33}We abstract from factors such as aggregate demand and the aggregate price level in market $k$, as these are cleaned out of our target moments.

\textsuperscript{34}Full depreciation of customer base on exit is assumed purely for computational tractability.
in customer base is subject to both convex costs of adjustment, and irreversibility:

\[
c(D_t^{ik}, A_t^{ik}) = \begin{cases} 
A_t^{ik} + \phi \left( \frac{A_t^{ik}}{D_t^{ik}} - \delta \right)^2 D_t^{ik} & \text{if } A_t^{ik} > 0 \\
0 & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\] (8)

This portion of the model resembles Arkolakis (2010), with the modification that customer base can be accumulated. The irreversibility assumption is very natural in the context of investment in an intangible such as customer base.

When making choices at date \( t \) with respect to market \( k \), firm \( i \) does not observe \( \varepsilon_t^{ik} \). But by participating, it may acquire information it can use to condition its future expectations of idiosyncratic demand. In the face of uncertainty about \( \varepsilon_t^{ik} \), it matters whether the firm sets prices or quantities. We assume that it sets prices. Because demand is CES and there are no strategic interactions with other firms, the optimal price is equal to the statically optimal markup over marginal cost \( (\frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}) \), irrespective of the firm’s participation history, information set, realization of \( \varepsilon_t^{ik} \), or customer base. In this sense, the model hardwires in both the orthogonality of initial prices and survival, and a flat path of prices with respect to market tenure (all of these conditional on marginal cost \( C_i^t \)).

To describe our model of learning, we must specify a process for idiosyncratic demand. We assume that idiosyncratic demand has two components, permanent and transitory:

\[
\varepsilon_t^{ik} = \nu_t^{ik} + \eta_t^{ik},
\]

with

\[
\nu_t^{ik} \sim N(0, \sigma_\nu^2)
\]

\[
\eta_t^{ik} = \rho \eta_{t-1}^{ik} + \zeta_t^{ik}
\]

\[
\zeta_t^{ik} \sim N(0, \sigma_\eta^2)
\]

We assume that firm \( i \) may be “uninformed” \( (N_{t-1}^{ik} = 0) \) or “informed” \( (N_{t-1}^{ik} = 1) \) about market \( k \) on entry to period \( t \). An uninformed firm knows only the unconditional distribution of \( \varepsilon_t^{ik} \). An informed firm observes \( \{\nu_t^{ik}, \eta_{t-1}^{ik}\} \). Potential entrants are always uninformed. Uninformed participants become informed with probability \( \gamma \) at the end of each period of participation. Conditional on continued participation, being informed is an absorbing state. On exiting a market, the firm (whether informed or uninformed), loses its draw of \( \{\nu_t^{ik}, \eta_{t-1}^{ik}\} \),
and knows that it will have to redraw from the unconditional distribution if it decides to participate again in the future.\footnote{This latter assumption is made purely for computational tractability.} As a result, information $I_{t}^{ik}$ about idiosyncratic demand evolves as follows:

$$I_{t}^{ik} = \begin{cases} \{ \nu_{t}^{ik}, \eta_{t-1}^{ik} \} & \text{if } \{ X_{t-1}^{ik} = 1, N_{t-1}^{ik} = 1 \} \\ \emptyset & \text{if } \{ X_{t-1}^{ik} = 0 \} \text{ or } \{ X_{t-1}^{ik} = 1, N_{t-1}^{ik} = 0 \} \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

This way of modeling information acquisition is both computationally tractable and flexible, in that it allows the average speed of learning to be fast ($\gamma$ close to 1) or slow ($\gamma$ close to 0), independent of the parameters of the idiosyncratic demand process. In contrast, under Bayesian learning, where the firm infers $\nu_{t}^{ik}$ by observing quantities sold in period $t-1$ ($I_{t}^{ik} = \{ \epsilon_{t-1}^{ik}, \epsilon_{t-2}^{ik}, \ldots \}$), the speed of learning is determined by the parameters of the idiosyncratic demand process. Under reasonable parameter values Bayesian learning is typically very fast, in the sense that the firm need only see one realization of $\epsilon_{t-1}^{ik}$ in order for the conditional expectation of $\nu_{t}^{ik}$ to be very close to the true value.\footnote{This is the case when we estimate our model with Bayesian learning.} So we see our model of learning as a tractable approximation to a model where firms are Bayesian, but only pay attention to $I_{t}^{ik} = \{ \epsilon_{t-1}^{ik}, \epsilon_{t-2}^{ik}, \ldots \}$ with probability $\gamma$.

Assuming that firms discount the future at rate $\beta$, we can write the intertemporal optimization problem as follows:

$$V \left( D_{t-1}^{ik}, X_{t-1}^{ik}, N_{t-1}^{ik}, I_{t}^{ik}, F_{t}^{ik}, S_{t}^{ik}, C_{t}^{i} \right) =$$

$$\max_{X_{t}^{ik} \in \{0, 1\}, A_{t}^{ik}} \left\{ X_{t}^{ik} \left( \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \right) \left( C_{t}^{i} \right)^{1-\theta} \left( D_{t}^{ik} \right)^{\alpha} \mathbb{E} \left( \exp \left( \nu_{t}^{ik} + \eta_{t-1}^{ik} \right) \middle| I_{t}^{ik} \right) - X_{t}^{ik} \left( F_{t}^{ik} + \left( 1 - X_{t-1}^{ik} \right) S_{t}^{ik} \right) - c \left( D_{t}^{ik}, A_{t}^{ik} \right) \right\}$$

$$\quad + \beta \mathbb{E} \left( V \left( D_{t+1}^{ik}, X_{t+1}^{ik}, N_{t+1}^{ik}, I_{t+1}^{ik}, F_{t+1}^{ik}, S_{t+1}^{ik}, C_{t+1}^{i} \middle| I_{t}^{ik} \right) \right) \quad (10)$$

subject to the accumulation equation for customer base, $(7)$, the cost of investment, $(8)$, and the updating of information, $(9)$, which includes the process for $N_{t}^{ik}$ as a function of lagged participation.
7 Model estimation and results

7.1 Estimation

In order to estimate the model, we must make some assumptions about the processes for marginal costs \( (C_i) \), sunk costs \( (S_{ik}) \), and fixed costs \( (F_{ik}) \). Because the demand side is our focus, and all of our target moments are based on demand-side variation alone, we abstract from supply-side heterogeneity, and set \( C_i = 1 \). Given this, we can assume very simple processes for \( S_{ik} \) and \( F_{ik} \). With probability \( \lambda \), independent across firms, markets, and over time, \( S_{ik} = 0 \), and entry is possible.\(^{37}\) With probability \( 1 - \lambda \), the sunk cost is infinity, and entry is not possible. With probability \( 1 - \omega \), independent across firms, markets, and over time, \( F_{ik} = F < \infty \), and the firm may choose to participate. With probability \( \omega \), the fixed cost is equal to infinity, and the firm must exit (or remain out of the market).\(^{38}\)

We use simulated method of moments to estimate the model. Given values for parameters \( \beta, \alpha, \delta, \phi, \theta, \sigma_v^2, \rho, \sigma_n^2, F, \omega, S, \lambda, \) and \( \gamma \), we discretize both exogenous and endogenous states\(^{39}\) and use value function iteration to solve for the optimal policies for participation and investment. Using the model parameters and the corresponding optimal policies, we then simulate post-entry trajectories for 50,000 “firm-markets.” To account for the fact that there are part-year effects in the data, the length of a period in our model is 6 months. We stagger entry across 6-month periods, and aggregate up to an annual frequency to construct the equivalents of the moments we estimate in Section 4. The goal of our estimation is to choose the vector of parameters that best matches these moments.

We match moments of four types. The first three sets of moments are based on our estimates conditional on firm-product-year and market fixed effects: the ratios of initial quantities across spells of different length; the evolution of quantities with market tenure within spells of different length; and the evolution of exit probabilities with market tenure. The fourth moment is the average exit rate in the first year in a market across all export spells in our data for which entry is not censored. We do not target moments related to prices, as they are matched automatically in our baseline model. The full set of 32 targeted moments is reported in column (1) of Table 6.

We first preset some parameters not identified by our target moments. Since we calibrate

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\(^{37}\)In the absence of cost heterogeneity, and under the assumption that all potential entrants have the same prior about idiosyncratic demand, the assumption that \( S = 0 \) is without loss of generality.

\(^{38}\)Given a suitable set of target moments, it would be very straightforward to introduce richer processes here.

\(^{39}\)We use three states each for the permanent and transitory idiosyncratic demand shocks (\( \nu \) and \( \eta \)). The number of endogenous states depends on parameter values.
to a 6-month period, we set \( \beta = 1.05^{-0.5} \). In our baseline model, \( \theta \) and \( \phi \) are not separately identified by our target moments. We pick \( \theta = 2 \) as a baseline value for \( \theta \). This is consistent with a markup over marginal cost (which does not include fixed costs of production or costs related to marketing and advertising) of 100\%.

The export entry rate in our model is equal to \( \lambda (1 - \omega) \). The average entry rate for non-participants across the 56 export markets that account for 99\% of exports is 1\%, so we set \( \omega = 0.01 / (1 - \omega) \).

This leaves us with nine parameters, \( \{ \alpha, \delta, \phi, \sigma^2, \rho, \sigma^2_n, F, \omega, \gamma \} \). We choose these parameters to minimize the criterion function \( m'Vm \), where \( m \) is the difference between the data moments and the equivalent moments in the model, and \( V \) is a diagonal matrix, with the inverse of the standard deviation of the estimates of the data moments on the diagonal (we do not include the entry rate in this matrix, as we hit this target by construction). We use a combination of a particle swarm algorithm and the simplex method to optimize over the parameter vector.

### 7.2 Baseline results

The first column of Table 6 reports the data moments. The second column reports the corresponding fitted values of the moments. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the fit of the model by graphing target and fitted moments for quantities and exit. The estimated model matches all of the key facts in the data. It generates dispersion in initial quantities that is positively correlated with spell length and of the right order of magnitude, quantities that increase with market tenure in successful spells as in the data, and an exit hazard that declines substantially between the first and second year in a market and continues to fall until about five years in the market, closely matching the data.

In the first row of Table 7, we report the estimated parameters of the baseline model, and an overall measure of fit based on the criterion function.\(^4\) Our estimate of \( \alpha \), the elasticity of sales with respect to customer base, is 0.50. This indicates that there is a significant role for customer base in explaining post-entry export dynamics. This customer base depreciates at a relatively rapid rate: our estimate of \( \delta \), 0.46, implies an annual rate of depreciation of 70\%, which is in line with what is found in the empirical literature on advertising summarized in

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\(^4\)The online appendix describes results based on alternative values for \( \theta \) in Tables A.70 and A.71.

\(^4\)Standard errors are constructed using the method suggested by Gourieroux et al. (1993), as described in the online appendix. They are sensitive to the calculation of the numerical derivatives of the moments with respect to individual parameters. The exercises where we estimate restricted versions of the model are more informative about the role played by individual parameters.
Figure 7: Model fit: Quantities

Notes: Figure shows data on evolution of quantities at the firm-product-market level with tenure by spell length from 2, and corresponding quantity trajectories for the structural model. All quantities are expressed relative to the quantity in a 1-year spell. Source: CSO and authors' calculations.

Figure 8: Model fit: Exit

Notes: Figure shows data on reduction in probability of exit at the firm-market level relative to probability of exit in the first year in a market, and corresponding evolution for the structural model. Figure does not illustrate exit rate in year 1. Source: CSO and authors’ calculations.
### Table 6: Data and model moments: Baseline and alternative structural models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>(9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s.e.</td>
<td>baseline no PY α = 0 no AC γ = 1 ρ = 0 fullinf bayes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln((Q_1^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>0.52 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>ln((Q_3^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>0.76 (0.04)</td>
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<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>ln((Q_4^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>0.95 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln((Q_6^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>1.08 (0.07)</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.90</td>
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<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.14</td>
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<td>0.96</td>
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<td>1.03</td>
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<td>1.39 (0.05)</td>
<td>1.40</td>
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<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.30</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.44</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.66</td>
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<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.63</td>
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<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.01 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
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<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln((Q_9^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>0.69 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln((Q_1^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>0.61 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln((Q_2^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>0.01 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln((Q_3^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>0.78 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln((Q_4^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>0.95 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln((Q_5^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>0.92 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>ln((Q_6^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>0.75 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln((Q_7^7/Q_1^1))</td>
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<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln((Q_8^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>0.88 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln((Q_9^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>1.20 (0.06)</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln((Q_1^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>1.34 (0.06)</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln((Q_2^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>1.37 (0.06)</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln((Q_3^7/Q_1^1))</td>
<td>1.33 (0.07)</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\begin{align*}
\text{exit}_1 & = 0.46 (0.004) \quad 0.42 \\
\text{exit}_2 - \text{exit}_1 & = -0.16 (0.005) \quad -0.19 \\
\text{exit}_3 - \text{exit}_1 & = -0.22 (0.005) \quad -0.23 \\
\text{exit}_4 - \text{exit}_1 & = -0.25 (0.006) \quad -0.25 \\
\text{exit}_5 - \text{exit}_1 & = -0.27 (0.006) \quad -0.28 \\
\text{exit}_6 - \text{exit}_1 & = -0.27 (0.007) \quad -0.29 \\
\end{align*}

Notes: Data quantity moments are based on second column of Table 4. Exit moments are based on second column of Table 5. exit\(_1\) is the average 1-year exit rate across all spells in the data for which entry is not censored. Standard error for exit\(_1\) is based on assuming the indicator for 1-year exit is binomially distributed. The full information model additionally targets the entry rate, which set equal to 1% by construction in all the other models. The target is 1% (s.e. 0.0001) and the fitted value for the entry rate for this model is 0.25%. Parameter estimates are reported in Table 7.
firms, suggesting shares in the range 17-27%.

We find that there are nontrivial fixed costs of export participation. For the ultimately successful spells (i.e. those lasting at least 7 years), these amount to to 15% of revenue in the initial year in a market and decline to 6% of revenue by year 6.

Table 7: Parameters and fit: Baseline and alternative structural models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>( \alpha )</th>
<th>( \delta )</th>
<th>( \phi )</th>
<th>( \gamma )</th>
<th>( \rho )</th>
<th>( \sigma_\nu )</th>
<th>( \sigma_\theta )</th>
<th>( \frac{F}{E[M]} )</th>
<th>( \omega )</th>
<th>( \lambda )</th>
<th>( \theta )</th>
<th>Fit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) baseline</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>3.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s.e.</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>( \dagger )</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) ( \alpha = 0 )</td>
<td></td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>32.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) no AC</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>5.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) ( \gamma = 1 )</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>17.63</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>6.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) ( \rho = 0 )</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>10.23</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>19.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) setq</td>
<td></td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) fullif</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>13.27</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>18.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) bayes</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>35.82</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>( n.a. )</td>
<td>16.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors on the baseline parameter estimates are calculated following Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault (1993) as described in the online appendix. \( \dagger \) The baseline estimate of \( F \) is 0.0131 and the standard error is 0.0105. “Fit” is the value of the criterion function, \( m^2V_m \), where \( m \) is the difference between data moments and moments of the model conditional on the parameter vector, and \( V \) is a diagonal matrix with the vector of inverses of the standard errors of the data moments on the diagonal. \( \dagger \) For the full information model, the criterion function minimized in the estimation includes the entry rate, but for comparability the fit value reported here includes only the baseline moments. For the quantity setting model, the criterion function minimized in the estimation includes price moments, but for comparability the fit value reported here includes only the baseline moments.

Bagwell (2007).\(^{42}\) Our estimated value of \( \phi \) is nonzero, consistent with adjustment costs à la Arkolakis (2010). In order to provide some intuition for the magnitude of \( \phi \), we calculate the weighted average expenditure on marketing and advertising (i.e., \( A_t^{ik} + c(D_t^{ik}, A_t^{ik}) \)) as a share of revenue. Since \( \phi \) and \( \theta \) move together, this share is a function of our baseline choice of \( \theta \). Unfortunately we do not have data on marketing and advertising expenditures which would allow us to use this to discipline \( \theta \). For export spells lasting at least seven years, 33% of revenues are devoted to marketing and advertising in the initial year in a market, while this declines to just under 23% of revenues by year 6 (see Table A.68 in the online appendix).\(^{43}\)

We find that there is a nontrivial variance of both permanent and mean-reverting idiosyncratic demand shocks. Idiosyncratic demand shocks are persistent, but not strikingly so. Meanwhile, our estimate of \( \gamma \), the parameter that governs the speed of learning, is equal to 0.57 on a 6-month basis. This implies that it is only at the beginning of their fourth year that over 99% of incumbents are informed (see Table A.69 in the online appendix).

We find that there are nontrivial fixed costs of export participation. For the ultimately successful spells (i.e those lasting at least 7 years), these amount to to 15% of revenue in the initial year in a market and decline to 6% of revenue by year 6.

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\(^{42}\)Eaton et al. (2014) report very high rates of attrition of exporter-importer matches, which is consistent with our finding of a high depreciation rate for customer base.

\(^{43}\)Gourio and Rudanko (2014) provide evidence from Compustat for manufacturing and nonmanufacturing firms, suggesting shares in the range 17-27%.
Finally, we estimate a modest probability of the firm-market experiencing a “death shock,” since $\omega = 0.03$ is the probability of exogenous exit on a 6-month basis. Most of exit out to seven years in a market is endogenous.

### 7.3 Restricted versions of the baseline model

We now examine the role played by each of the features of the model by eliminating them one-by-one, and where appropriate, re-estimating. This is helpful in understanding the mapping between moments and parameters.

First we assess the contribution of part-year effects to the fit of the baseline model. To do this, we keep all parameters fixed, but calculate the targeted moments assuming that all entrants enter at the beginning of a year, rather than half entering in the first 6-month period, and half entering in the second 6-month period. The implied moments are reported in column (3) of Table 6. Figures A.54 and A55 in the online appendix illustrate the results. Part-year effects are key to matching the relationship between initial quantities in 1-year export spells and initial quantities in longer export spells, but not to matching the relationships between initial quantities in spells longer than 1 year. They also play a role in matching within-spell growth rates, not just in the first and last years in a spell, but also to some extent in the second year of a spell, though they are not responsible for all of within-spell quantity growth. Finally, they play a role in matching the decline in the exit hazard between year 1 and year 2 in a market, but they are not key to the subsequent behavior of exit.

We next shut down customer capital by setting $\alpha = 0$. When we do this, the parameters $\delta$ and $\phi$ become redundant. Now the only intertemporal choice faced by the firm is whether or not to participate.\(^{44}\) Column (4) of Table 6 reports the fitted moments and row (2) of Table 7 reports the estimated parameters of this model, while figures A.56 and A.57 in the online appendix illustrate the results. This model can generate an increasing relationship between initial quantities and spell length, but it is incapable of generating within-spell quantity growth beyond that due to part-year effects and exogenous idiosyncratic demand. In order to try to match within-spell quantity dynamics, the estimated standard deviation of the mean-reverting component of idiosyncratic demand is very large, which implies that the fit of the exit trajectory is very poor.

We shut down all adjustment costs of investment by setting $\phi = 0$ and allowing for full reversibility of investment expenditures (the firm can “consume” inherited $D$). This means

\(^{44}\)This model resembles that of Das et al. (2007), but with the addition of learning about idiosyncratic demand.
that learning and part-year effects are the only sources of dynamics in the model. Column (5) of Table 6 reports the fitted moments and row (3) of Table 7 reports the estimated parameters of this model, while Figures A.58 and A.59 in the online appendix illustrate the results. Somewhat surprisingly, learning is faster in this model than in the baseline. This model can match the increasing relationship between initial quantities and spell length, and the reduction in exit hazard with market tenure. Relative to the baseline model, it has difficulty matching within-spell quantity growth: almost all of the dynamics of within-spell quantities happen within the first year. This is not a foregone conclusion - with slower learning, this model could generate dynamics over a longer period, but it appears that slower learning distorts other moments more than it improves the fit of within-spell quantity growth.

We partially shut down learning by setting $\gamma = 1$, which implies that at the end of the first period, all participants learn their permanent and (lagged) transitory idiosyncratic demand. The only source of dynamics in quantities after period 2 is due to adjustment costs and residual dynamics from part-year effects. Column (6) of Table 6 reports the fitted moments and row (4) of Table 7 reports the estimated parameters of this model, while Figures A.60 and A.61 in the online appendix illustrate the results. Unsurprisingly, the value of $\phi$ increases, as costs of adjustment substitute for learning in generating post-entry dynamics. The fit of this model is in fact remarkably similar to the learning-only model, though the fit for quantity growth is marginally better, while fit of initial quantities and the exit is somewhat worse.

We also estimate the model imposing $\rho = 0$ (i.e., zero autocorrelation of the transitory component of the exogenous idiosyncratic demand shock). Column (7) of Table 6 reports the fitted moments and row (5) of Table 7 reports the estimated parameters, while Figures A.62 and A.63 in the online appendix illustrate the results. This model is unable to generate different quantity dynamics in export spells of different lengths (apart from part-year effects in the year of exit). Although our point estimate of $\rho$ in the baseline model may seem low, this exercise shows that it is crucial to allow for autocorrelation of transitory idiosyncratic demand in order to match the different behavior of quantities in short and long export spells.

### 7.4 Non-nested alternative models

We also examine what happens when we modify the model in ways that are not nested in our baseline.

We estimate a model where there is no customer base, firms set quantities rather than prices, and this alone combined with learning about idiosyncratic demand generates dy-
namics in quantities. With this model, we target price moments in addition to quantity moments, and we also estimate $\theta$, the price elasticity of demand, since in this model it is identified by the combination of quantity and price moments. Row (6) of Table 7 reports the estimated parameters of this model, while Table A.67 and Figures A.64, A.65 and A.66 in the online appendix report the fit of the various moments. In order to match the fact that there are substantial dynamics of quantities, but no dynamics of prices, the model requires $\theta = 36$. Notwithstanding this very high value, the estimated model implies that initial prices are more than 10% higher in spells that last at least 3 years than in spells that last only 1 year, in direct contradiction to the data. It also implies that falling prices signal exit, in contrast to the data. Finally, the model provides a very poor fit to the exit trajectory, as learning is estimated to be very fast.

Additionally, we estimate a model without any learning, where firms observe both components of their idiosyncratic demand ($\nu$ and $\eta$) before taking any decisions. Column (8) of Table 6 reports the fitted moments and row (7) of Table 7 reports the estimated parameters, while Figures A.67 and A.68 in the online appendix illustrate the results. The full information model has difficulty matching 1-year exit rates, and the exit trajectory more generally. It requires very high standard deviations of both components of idiosyncratic shocks in order to generate a positive relationship between initial quantities and survival.

Finally, we modify our baseline model by assuming that firms are Bayesian, and use the Kalman filter to update their beliefs about the two components of idiosyncratic demand based on realizations of quantities. This model is considerably more computationally demanding to solve and estimate than the other models we consider. Column (9) of Table 6 reports the fitted moments and row (8) of Table 7 reports the estimated parameters, while Figures A.69 and A.70 in the online appendix illustrate the results. This model overpredicts initial quantities and growth in the longest spells, and it fails strikingly to match the behavior of exit, generating too little exit in the first year, and being unable to generate dynamics in exit beyond the second year. This is because the parameters of the idiosyncratic demand process necessary to match the behavior of quantities imply very rapid learning: after participating one period in the market, firms assign 99% probability to their true $\nu$. This shows that the assumption of slow learning is key to the success of our baseline model.

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45 This model is similar to that in Berman et al. (2015) and Arkolakis et al. (2017), except that we allow idiosyncratic demand to be autocorrelated ($\rho > 0$) and model learning as stochastic rather than Bayesian.

46 We restrict the SMM algorithm for our estimates of the Bayesian model to 25,000 rather than 50,000 independent draws of “firm-markets.” This model still takes an order of magnitude longer to estimate than the baseline model.
7.5 Summary

To sum up, our baseline model provides a good fit to all the moments of the data. Accumulation of customer base plays a key role in explaining the post-entry dynamics of export quantities and export prices. Slow learning about idiosyncratic demand is key to matching the behavior of exit. While qualitatively, either costs of adjusting customer base or slow learning could explain the evolution of quantities and exit, quantitatively both of these mechanisms are necessary.

8 Implications for adjustment to shocks

We now show that our findings can provide at least a partial answer to a key question in international macroeconomics and trade: why are short-run elasticities of exports with respect to prices smaller than long-run elasticities? In this section, we simulate our model, showing that it generates sluggish adjustment in response to shocks. In addition, we show that it can generate responses to news shocks. This is true even though entry is exogenous in our model, and there is no general equilibrium feedback through marginal cost. For illustrative purposes, we focus on shocks to ad valorem tariffs, but the implications are not limited to this type of shock.

All of our simulations take the same form. We fix all parameters at our baseline estimates. We solve for the policy functions of the firm under two different tariff environments. We simulate the behavior of 1,000,000 “firms” for 100 years (i.e. 200 periods) using the initial policy function in the relevant experiment. This gives us an initial distribution of market participants in terms of customer base, information and idiosyncratic demand in year 0. In the first half of year 1, the particular experiment is initiated, and we simulate responses for 20 years (i.e. 40 periods). We also use the same draws for idiosyncratic shocks to simulate a counterfactual world where tariffs do not change. We then sum exports across all firms in order to illustrate the implied dynamics of aggregates in both experiment and counterfactual.

8.1 Short vs long run responses to shocks

We first examine the timing of responses to shocks. Demand for each firm is given by:

\[ Q_{ik}^t = \left( \tau_i^k P_{ik}^t \right)^{-\theta} \left( D_{ik}^t \right)^{\alpha} \exp\left( \varepsilon_{ik}^t \right). \]

See e.g. Hooper et al. (2000) and Gallaway et al. (2003).
We assume first that tariffs are equal to 5% ($\tau_H = 1.05$) through year 0. At the beginning of year 1, it is announced, unexpectedly, that in that period and from then on, tariffs will fall to 0 ($\tau_L = 1$). We simulate responses of aggregate exports under this experiment, as well as under the counterfactual where tariffs remain (and are expected to remain) equal to 5% throughout. It is convenient to report the results in terms of the elasticity of aggregate exports with respect to the shock at different time horizons. We calculate this elasticity as follows. Let $X_t$ denote aggregate exports at year $t$ in our experiment, and let $X'_t$ denote aggregate exports at year $t$ in the counterfactual. Similarly, let $\tau_t$ denote the tariff at year $t$ in our experiment, and let $\tau'_t$ denote the tariff at year $t$ in the counterfactual. Then we calculate the elasticity using:

$$\sigma_t = \frac{\ln X_t - \ln X'_t}{\ln \tau_t - \ln \tau'_t}$$

The time series of this elasticity is reported in Figure 9. On impact, the elasticity is 2.7 (note that this is greater than the price elasticity of demand which is given by $\theta = 2$), and rises to 3.4 after 10 years.

Figure 9: Simulation results: Short vs long run elasticities with respect to tariff shocks

Notes: Figure shows simulated elasticity of aggregate exports with respect to an unexpected 5% change in tariffs at the beginning of year 1, based on 1 million “firms” and baseline parameter estimates. Costs, foreign demand and entry are held fixed. Source: Authors’ calculations.

In a second version of this exercise, we assume that tariffs are equal to 0 through year 0, and that the unexpected announcement at the beginning of year 1 is that tariffs have risen to 5%. The elasticity based on this second exercise and the corresponding counterfactual
where tariffs remain constant at 0 throughout is also reported in Figure 9. Adjustment to this negative shock also takes time. There is a mild degree of asymmetry in responses to positive and negative shocks. On impact, the response to the negative shock is smaller (elasticity is 2.65 rather than 2.7), but after that, adjustment is faster (elasticity is 3.4 by 6 years after the announcement rather than 10 years after). Across both exercises, on average the long-run elasticity (after 10 years) is 1.3 times larger than the short-run elasticity (after 1 year). This compares to a ratio of long to short run elasticities in Galloway et al. of 2.

Figure 10: Simulation results: Elasticities with respect to news shocks about tariffs

Notes: Figure shows simulated elasticity of aggregate exports with respect to an unexpected announcement at the beginning of year 1 that tariffs will change by 5% at the beginning of year 5, based on 1 million “firms” and baseline parameter estimates. Costs, foreign demand and entry are held fixed. Source: Authors’ calculations.

8.2 Responses to news shocks

In our second exercise, we examine how exports respond to news about future tariffs. We first look at good news. We assume that tariffs are equal to 5% through year 0. At the beginning of year 1 it is announced unexpectedly that from the start of year 5, tariffs will fall to 0. We simulate responses of aggregate exports under this experiment, as well as under the counterfactual where tariffs remain and are expected to remain at 5% throughout. We then calculate the elasticity of aggregate exports with respect to the tariff change at different time horizons, using the future tariff change for years 1 through 4, as actual tariffs remain
unchanged during this period:

\[ \sigma_t = \frac{\ln X_t - \ln X'_t}{\ln (1.05) - \ln (1.00)} \]

The time series of this elasticity is reported in Figure 10. Aggregate exports do respond in advance of the change in the actual tariff, though the magnitude of the response to positive news is small.

In a second version of this exercise, we assume that tariffs are equal to 0 through year 0. At the beginning of year 1 it is announced unexpectedly that from the start of year 5, tariffs will rise to 5%. The elasticity based on this experiment (and the corresponding counterfactual) is also reported in Figure 10. In the case of bad news, there is a non-trivial response in advance of the change in the actual tariff.

9 Conclusion

We use customs microdata to distinguish between three competing models of demand and customer base used in the literature on firm dynamics, business cycles, and international trade. These competing models have quite different predictions about the behavior of prices, and this is what we exploit to distinguish between them. Our findings on the behavior of prices are inconsistent with models where firms learn about idiosyncratic demand through prices, and grow by sliding down their demand curves. More importantly, they are inconsistent with models where demand depends on lagged sales, and firms grow by charging markups below their steady state level, gradually increasing them as sales expand. Models with this feature have been widely applied in firm dynamics, business cycles, and international trade. But our findings shift attention away from markups and towards non-price actions such as marketing and advertising as the key mechanism through which firms acquire customers and expand sales within a market. They suggest that further research on the role of marketing and advertising in firm growth, business cycles, and international trade would be very valuable.

References


