2010- Reprints: Operations Research and Decisions
Multi-item lot-sizing with joint set-up costs, Mathematical Programming, 119(1), 79-94, 2009.
S. Anily, M. Tzur and L.A. Wolsey
(Reprint No. 153)
We consider a multi-item lot-sizing problem with joint set-up costs and constant capacities. Apart from the usual per unit production and storage costs for each item, a set-up cost is incurred for each batch of production, where a batch consists of up to C units of any mix of the items. In addition, an upper bound on the number of batches may be imposed. Under widely applicable conditions on the storage costs, namely that the production and storage costs are nonspeculative, and for any two items the one that has a higher storage cost in one period has a higher storage cost in every period, we show that there is a tight linear program with O(mT2) constraints and variables that solves the joint set-up multi-item lot-sizing problem, where m is the number of items and T is the number of time periods. This establishes that under the above storage cost conditions this problem is polynomially solvable. For the problem with backlogging, a similar linear programming result is described for the uncapacitated case under very restrictive conditions on the storage and backlogging costs. Computational results are presented to test the effectiveness of using these tight linear programs in strengthening the basic mixed integer programming formulations of the joint set-up problem both when the storage cost conditions are satisfied, and also when they are violated.
Cooperation in service systems, Operations Research, 58 (3), 660-673, 2010.
S. Anily and M. Haviv
(Reprint No. 179)
We consider a number of servers that may improve the efficiency of the system by pooling their service capacities to serve the union of the individual streams of customers. This economies-of-scope phenomenon is due to the reduction in the steady-state mean total number of customers in the system. The question we pose is how the servers should split among themselves the cost of the pooled system. When the individual incoming streams of customers form Poisson processes and individual service times are exponential, we define a transferable utility cooperative game in which the cost of a coalition is the mean number of customers (or jobs) in the pooled system. We show that, even though the characteristic function is neither monotone nor concave, the game and its subgames possess nonempty cores. In other words, for any subset of servers there exist cost-sharing allocations under which no partial subset can take advantage by breaking away and forming a separate coalition. We give an explicit expression for all (infinitely many) nonnegative core cost allocations of this game. Finally, we show that, except for the case where all individual servers have the same cost, there exist infinitely many core allocations with negative entries, and we show how to construct a convex subset of the core where at least one server is being paid to join the grand coalition.
