2010 - Reprints: Finance, Accounting and Insurance

NO ABSTRACT

Pharmaceutical companies decide how much to invest in developing new drugs and promoting existing ones, thereby influencing the rate of drug discovery and the state of biomedical research funding.  The relative emphasis on innovation compared with marketing depends on how these activities affect the short term profitability and the long term value of the company.  To understand why companies invest extensively in promoting existing products when drug discovery seems to be their core value-generator, we examined the spending on research and development (R&D) versus sales and marketing by pharmaceutical companies over the past three decades.

This paper formalizes the following intuition about open-market share repurchases. Firms do open-market share repurchases to return free cash, which would otherwise be wasted. However, when the firm goes to buy its own shares with this cash, it has inside information and hence the actual execution is characterized by adverse selection. The market knows that the firm has inside information, and consequently the ask price is high to compensate for this adverse selection problem. This implies that, all else equal, the greater the adverse selection problem compared to the cash waste problem, the higher the ask price, and, therefore, the wider the bid–ask spread and the lower the share repurchase completion rate. We test this implication on a sample of U.S. firms and report evidence consistent with the model.

This study extends Ertimur et al. (2003) and Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006a) by providing a contextual framework for the information content of revenue and earnings surprises. I find that the influence of earnings surprises (revenue surprises) on stock returns is lower (higher) in R&D intensive companies. Also, market reaction to earnings surprises is lower in the fourth quarter, and to revenue surprises it is higher in industries with oligopolistic competition. A comprehensive analysis indicates that, in contrast to previous studies for the full sample, in several contexts market reaction to earnings surprises is not higher than to revenue surprises.

Motivated by the European Union (EU) decision to mandate application of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to the consolidated financial statements of all EU listed firms (Regulation (EC) 1606/2002), starting in December 2005, we compare the value relevance of accounting information in 14 European countries in the year prior to and the year of the mandatory adoption of the IFRS. We focus on three accounting information items for which measurements under IFRS are likely to differ considerably from measurements under domestic accounting practices across the EU countries prior to the introduction of the international standards:  goodwill, research and development expenses (R&D), and asset revaluation. These three items, selected on an a priori basis, have been shown in previous research to differ in the effect of uncertainty on their future benefits. We use valuation models that include these three variables and in addition the book value of equity and earnings.  Overall, our study suggests that the adoption of the IFRS has increased the value relevance of the three accounting numbers for investors in equity securities in the EU.  Association tests support our two hypotheses: (1) in the year prior to the mandatory adoption of the IFRS, the incremental value relevance to investors of the three domestic GAAP-based accounting items was greater in countries where the respective domestic standards were more compatible with the IFRS; and (2) the higher the deviation of the three domestic GAAP-based accounting items from their corresponding IFRS values, the greater the incremental value relevance to investors from the switch to IFRS. These associations prevail when considering cross-country differences in the institutional environments, which tend to provide complementary effects.

This paper extends Noe’s (Rev Financial Studies 15:289–317, 2002) model of large shareholder activism in two directions. First, it considers a framework in which large shareholders can choose not only when to monitor, but also how intensively they want to monitor the firm. Second, it considers the impact of laws and regulations by introducing a governance quality parameter that makes monitoring more cost effective. The model yields a new and rich characterization of activism. We find that share wealth (ownership concentration) induces monitoring for higher firm value through more frequent monitoring with unchanged intensity. Cash wealth motivates activism for trading gains, not higher firm value, through less frequent monitoring coupled with higher intensity.  We also find that better governance leads to higher firm value through more frequent but less intense activism. When asymmetries within the group of large shareholders exist, the model predicts that the larger/wealthier/more efficient shareholders are more active. These results are broadly consistent with the empirical evidence.